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Abstract
We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude, allowing a decision maker’s risk
attitude to be affected by his history of disappointments and elations. The decision maker recursively evaluates compound risks, classifying realizations as disappointing or elating using
a threshold rule. We establish equivalence between the model and two cognitive biases: risk
attitudes are reinforced by experiences (one is more risk averse after disappointment than after
elation) and there is a primacy effect (early outcomes have the greatest impact on risk attitude).
In dynamic asset pricing, the model yields volatile, path-dependent prices.
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Once bitten, twice shy. — Proverb
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Introduction

Theories of decision making under risk typically assume that risk preferences are stable. Evidence
suggests, however, that risk preferences may vary with personal experiences. It has been shown
that emotions, which may be caused by exogenous factors or by the outcomes of past choices, play
a large role in the decision to bear risk. Moreover, individuals are affected by unrealized outcomes,
a phenomenon known in the psychological literature as counterfactual thinking.1
Empirical work has found evidence of history-dependent risk aversion in a variety of fields.
Pointing to adverse consequences for investment and the possibility of poverty traps, development
economists have observed a long-lasting increase in risk aversion after natural disasters (Cameron
and Shah, 2010) and, studying the dynamics of farming decisions in an experimental setting, increases of risk aversion after failures (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). Malmendier and Nagel (2011)
study how personal experiences of macroeconomic shocks affect financial risk-taking. Controlling
for wealth, income, age, and year effects, they find that for up to three decades later, “households
with higher experienced stock market returns express a higher willingness to take financial risk,
participate more in the stock market, and conditional on participating, invest more of their liquid
assets in stocks.” Applied work also demonstrates that changing risk aversion helps explain several economic phenomena. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) allow risk aversion to decrease
with prior stock market gains (and increase with losses), and show that their model is consistent
with the well-documented equity premium and excess volatility puzzles. Gordon and St-Amour
(2000) study bull and bear markets, allowing risk attitudes to vary stochastically by introducing a
state-dependent CRRA parameter in a discounted utility model. They show that countercyclical
risk aversion best explains the cyclical nature of equity prices, suggesting that “future work should
address the issue of determining the factors that underline the movements in risk preferences”
which they identified.
In this work, we propose a model under which such shifts in risk preferences may arise. Our
model of history-dependent risk attitude (HDRA) allows the way that risk unfolds over time to affect attitude towards further risk. We derive predictions for the comparative statics of risk aversion.
In particular, our model predicts that one becomes more risk averse after a negative experience
than after a positive one, and that sequencing matters: the earlier one is disappointed, the more risk
averse one becomes.
1 On

the effect of emotions, see Knutson and Green (2008) and Kuhnen and Knutson (2011), as well as Section 1.1.
Roese and Olson (1995) offers a comprehensive overview of the counterfactual thinking literature.
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To ease exposition, we begin by describing our HDRA model in the simple setting of T -stage,
compound lotteries (the model is later extended to stochastic decision problems, in which the DM
may take intermediate actions). A realization of a compound lottery is another compound lottery, which is one stage shorter. In the HDRA model, the DM categorizes each realization of a
compound lottery as an elating or disappointing outcome. At each stage, the DM’s history is the
preceding sequence of elations and disappointments. Each possible history h corresponds to a preference relation over one-stage lotteries, which comes from an admissible set of preferences. These
one-stage preferences are rankable in terms of their risk aversion. For example, an admissible
1−ρ
collection could be a class of expected utility preferences with a Bernoulli function u(x) = x1−ρ h ,
h
where the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ h is history dependent.
The key features of the HDRA model are that compound lotteries are evaluated recursively and
that the DM’s history assignment is internally consistent. More formally, starting at the final stage
of the compound lottery and proceeding backwards, each one-stage lottery is replaced with its appropriate, history-dependent certainty equivalent. At each step of this recursive process, the DM
is evaluating only one-stage lotteries, the outcomes of which are certainty equivalents of continuation lotteries. To determine which outcomes are elating and disappointing, the DM uses a threshold
rule that assigns a number (a threshold level) to each one-stage lottery encountered in the recursive
process. Internal consistency requires that if a sublottery is considered an elating (disappointing)
outcome of its parent sublottery, then its certainty equivalent should indeed exceed (or fall below)
the threshold level corresponding to its parent sublottery. Mathematically, internal consistency
imposes a fixed point requirement on the assignment of histories in a multistage setting.
Our model is general, allowing a wide class of preferences to be used for recursively evaluating lotteries, as well as a variety of threshold rules. The one-stage preferences may come from
the betweenness class (Dekel, 1986; Chew, 1989), which includes expected utility as a special
case. The DM’s threshold rule may be either endogenous (preference-based) or exogenous. In the
preference-based case, the DM’s threshold moves endogenously with his preference; he compares
the certainty equivalent of a sublottery to the certainty equivalent of its parent. In the exogenous
case, the DM uses a rule that is independent of preferences but is a function of the lottery at hand;
for example, an expectation-based rule that compares the certainty equivalent of a sublottery to his
expected certainty equivalent. All of the components of the HDRA model – that is, the single-stage
preferences, threshold rule, and history assignment – can be elicited from choice behavior.
Besides internal consistency, we do not place any restriction on how risk aversion should depend on the history. Nonetheless, we show that the HDRA model predicts two well-documented
cognitive biases; and that these biases are sufficient conditions for an HDRA representation to ex-
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ist. First, the DM’s risk attitudes are reinforced by prior experiences: he becomes less risk averse
after positive experiences and more risk averse after negative ones. Second, the DM displays a
primacy effect: his risk attitudes are disproportionately affected by early realizations. In particular,
the earlier the DM is disappointed, the more risk averse he becomes. We discuss evidence for these
predictions in Section 1.1 below.
We apply our model to study a multi-period asset pricing problem in a representative agent
economy with CARA preferences. We show that the model yields volatile, path-dependent prices.
Past realizations of dividends affect subsequent prices, even though they are statistically independent of future dividends and there are no income effects. For example, high dividends bring about
price increases, while a sequence of only low dividends leads to an equity premium higher than
in the standard, history-independent CARA case. Since risk aversion is endogenously affected by
dividend realizations, the risk from holding an asset is magnified by expected future variation in
the level of risk aversion. Hence the HDRA model introduces a channel of risk that is reflected in
the greater volatility of asset prices. This is consistent with the observation of excess volatility in
equity prices, dating to Shiller (1981).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 surveys evidence for the reinforcement and primacy effects. Section 1.2 discusses the related literature. Section 2 presents a basic
version of our model, which is rich enough to qualitatively explain our main results. Section 3
contains our main result, and studies additional implications of the model. Section 4 extends the
model to allow for intermediate choices and applies it to an asset-pricing problem. Section 5 provides the general version of our model, shows that our main results extend, and describes how the
components of the model can be elicited from choice behavior.
1.1

Evidence for the Reinforcement and Primacy Effects

Our main predictions, the reinforcement and primacy effects, are consistent with a body of evidence on risk-taking behavior. Thaler and Johnson (1990) find that individuals become more risk
averse after negative experiences and less risk averse after positive ones. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2011) estimate a marked increase in risk aversion in a sample of Italian investors after the
2008 financial crisis; the certainty equivalent of a risky gamble drops from 4,000 euros to 2,500,
an increase in risk aversion which, as the authors show, cannot be due to changes in wealth, consumption habits, or background risk. As discussed earlier, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) also find
that macroeconomic shocks lead to a long-lasting increase of risk aversion. Studying initial public
offerings (IPOs), Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) identify pairs of “hot and cold” IPOs with close offer
dates and follow the future subscription activities of investors whose first IPO subscription was in
3

one of those two. They find that “twice as many investors participate in a subsequent offering if
they first experience a hot offering rather than a cold offering.” Pointing to a primacy effect, they
find that the initial outcome has a strong impact on subsequent offerings, and that “by the tenth
offering, 65% of investors in the hot IPO group will have subscribed to another IPO, compared to
only 39% in the cold IPO group.” Baird and Zelin (2000) study the impact of sequencing of positive and negative news in a company president’s letter. They find a primacy effect, showing that
information provided early in the letter has the strongest impact on evaluations of that company’s
performance. In general, sequencing biases such as the primacy effect are robust and long-standing
experimental phenomena (early literature includes Anderson (1965)); and several empirical studies, including Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)),
argue that early experiences may shape financial or cultural attitudes.2
The biological basis of changes in risk aversion has been studied by neuroscientists.3 As summarized in Knutson and Green (2008) and Kuhnen and Knutson (2011), neuroimaging studies have
shown that two parts of the brain, the nucleus accumbens and the anterior insula, play a large role in
risky decisions. The nucleus accumbens processes information on rewards, and is associated with
positive emotions and excitement; while the anterior insula processes information about losses,
and is associated with negative emotions and anxiety. Controlling for wealth and information, activation of the nucleus accumbens (anterior insula) is associated with bearing greater (lesser) risk
in investment decisions. Moreover, Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) note:
Specifically in the context of feedback about decisions under risk [. . .] activation in
the nucleus accumbens increases when we learn that the outcome of a past choice was
better than expected (Delgado et al. (2000), Pessiglione et al. (2006)). Activation in
the anterior insula increases when the outcome is worse than expected (Seymour et
al (2004), Pessiglione et al (2006)), and when actions not chosen have larger payoffs
than the chosen one.
In a neuroimaging study with 90 sequential investment decisions by subjects, these feedback effects
are shown to influence subsequent risk-taking behavior (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011).
2 Another well-known sequencing bias is the recency effect, according to which more recent experiences have the
strongest effect. A recency effect on risk attitude is opposite to the prediction of our model.
3 At the endocrine level, researchers have also noted that increases in testosterone levels are associated with increased risk-taking behavior (see for example Sapienza, Zingales and Maestripieri (2009) and references within).
Moreover, testosterone levels may rise with winning and fall with losing: in particular, it has been shown that both
fans watching, and players participating in, sporting events exhibit an increase in testosterone when their team wins
(Bernhardt et. al. (1998) and Oliveira et. al. (2009), respectively).
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1.2

Relations to the literature

In many theories of choice over temporal lotteries, risk aversion could depend on the passage
of time, wealth effects or habit formation in consumption; see Kreps and Porteus (1978), Segal
(1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Rozen (2010), among others. We study how risk
attitudes are affected by the past, independently of such effects. In the HDRA model, risk attitudes depend on “what might have been.” Such counterfactual thinking means that our model
relaxes consequentialism (Machina, 1989; Hanany and Klibanoff, 2007), an assumption that is
maintained by the papers above. Counterfactual thinking may lead to a preference for dominated
options in some situations; this observation is further explored in Section 3.3. Our form of historydependence is conceptually distinct from models where current and future beliefs affect current
utility (that is, dependence of utility on “what might be” in the future). This literature includes, for
example, Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Köszegi and Rabin (2009).
Caplin and Leahy (2001) propose a two-period model where the prize space of a lottery is
enriched to contain psychological states, and there is an (unspecified) mapping from physical lotteries to mental states. Depending on how the second-period mental state is specified to depend on
the first, Caplin and Leahy’s model could explain various types of risk-taking behaviors in the first
period. While discussing the possibility of second-period disappointment, they do not address the
question of history-dependence in choices. We conjecture that with additional periods and an appropriate specification of the mapping between mental states, one could replicate the predictions of
our model. Köszegi and Rabin (2009) propose a utility function over T -period risky consumption
streams. In their model, period utility is the sum of current consumption utility and the expectation
of a gain-loss utility function, over all percentiles, of consumption utility at that percentile under
the ex-post belief minus consumption utility at that percentile under the ex-ante belief. Beliefs are
determined by an equilibrium notion, leading to multiplicity of possible beliefs. This bears resemblance to the multiplicity of internally consistent history assignments in our model (see Section
3.5 on how different assignments correspond to different attitudes to compound risks). Köszegi
and Rabin (2009) do not address the question of history-dependence: given an ex-ante belief over
consumption, utility is not affected by prior history (how that belief was formed). While they point
out that it would be realistic for comparisons to past beliefs to matter beyond one lag, they suggest
one way to potentially model Thaler and Johnson (1990)’s result in their framework: “by assuming
that a person receives money, and in the same period makes decisions on how to spend the money
– with her old expectations still determining current preferences” (Köszegi and Rabin, 2009, Footnote 6). We conjecture that with additional historical differences in beliefs and an appropriate
choice of functional forms (and relaxing additivity), one could replicate our predictions.
5
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A basic model of history-dependent risk attitude

We now present a basic model of history-dependent risk attitude in the setting of three-stage lotteries. Our general model, which we preview at the end of this section, appears in Section 5.
Consider an interval of prizes X = [w, b] ⊂ R, where w is the worst prize and b is the best prize.
Let L (X), or simply L 1 , denote the set of all simple, one-stage lotteries over X (i.e., lotteries
that give positive probability for a finite number of outcomes in X). The set L 2 = L (L 1 ) is
the set of two-stage lotteries – that is, simple lotteries whose outcomes are themselves one-stage
lotteries. In this section, the domain of choice of the DM is L 3 = L (L 2 ), the set of simple threestage compound lotteries. Before proceeding, we collect some useful notations and definitions.
Elements in L t are denoted by capital letters, e.g., Pt , Qt , or Rt . For simplicity, we often use
lowercase letters to denote one-stage lotteries (e.g., p, q, or r). For any x ∈ X, we write δ tx for the
degenerate t-stage lottery which gives the prize x with probability one. Similarly, for any p ∈ L 1 ,
δ tp denotes the t + 1-stage lottery in which the first t − 1 stages are degenerate and the lottery p
is received in period t. For t = 1, 2, Pt is a sublottery of Pt+1 if it is in the support of Pt+1 ; and
a one-stage lottery P1 is a sublottery of P3 if it is in the support of some P2 which is a sublottery
of P3 .4 We use hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i to denote the (t + 1)-stage lottery which gives the sublottery
Ptj with probability α j . A one-stage lottery is simply written as hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i. The last two
notations presume the outcomes are all distinct.
An example of a three-stage lottery P3 is visualized in Figure 1(a), where p, q, r, and s are onestage lotteries. In the first stage of P3 , there is an equal chance that the DM faces the sublottery
giving s with probability one (the right branch) or faces an additional stage of risk before learning
which lottery governs his winnings (the left branch). Under the two-stage sublottery P2 in the left
branch, DM receives each of the lotteries p and r with probability 41 , and receives lottery q with
probability 12 . To summarize, P3 = h.5, P12 ; .5, P22 i, P12 = h.25, p; .5, q; .25, ri and P22 = h1, si = δ s .
The DM classifies each sublottery as either an elating or a disappointing outcome of the sublottery from which it emanates. Formally, the initial history – i.e. prior to any resolution of risk –
is empty (0). If a sublottery is degenerate – i.e., it leads to some sublottery with probability one
– then the DM is not exposed to risk at that stage and his history is unchanged. If a sublottery is
nondegenerate, each sublottery in its support may be an elating (e) or a disappointing (d) outcome.
The DM’s history at any sublottery is the preceding sequence of e’s and d’s. The set of all possible
histories is thus given by H = {0, e, d, ee, ed, de, dd}. For each P3 , the history assignment a(·|P3 )
4 Note that within a lottery P3 , the same one-stage lottery could appear in the support of different two-stage sublotteries of P3 . Keeping this possibility in mind, but in order to economize on notation, throughout the paper we implicitly
identify a particular sublottery by the sequence of sublotteries leading to it.
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Figure 1: The three-stage lottery P3 , and a history assignment, are seen in (a). The two-stage lottery
P̃2 is shown in (b), where each terminal one-stage lottery in P3 is replaced with its certainty equivalent given the history assignment. The one-stage lottery P̃1 is shown in (c), where each terminal
one-stage lottery in P̃2 is replaced with its certainty equivalent given the history assignment.
denotes the history h ∈ H of each sublottery of P3 . We initialize a(P3 |P3 ) = 0. Within a lottery
P3 , the history assignment in thus sequential: if Pt+1 is nondegenerate and Pt is in its support, then
a(Pt |P3 ) ∈ {a(Pt+1 |P3 )} × {e, d}, while if Pt+1 is degenerate then a(Pt |P3 ) = a(Pt+1 |P3 ).
The DM’s evaluation of a sublottery is determined by the sequence of elating or disappointing
outcomes leading to it. Each history h ∈ H corresponds to an expected utility function Vh = E(uh )
over one-stage lotteries, with strictly increasing Bernoulli function uh . Let V = {Vh }h∈H . The
history assignment a determines which Vh is applied. To study how risk attitudes are shaped by
prior experiences, we require the utility functions after each history to be (strictly) rankable in
terms of their risk aversion, according to the following comparative measure:
Definition 1. We say that Vh is more risk averse than Vh0 , denoted Vh >RA Vh0 , if for any x ∈ X and
any nondegenerate p ∈ L 1 , Vh (p) ≥ Vh (δ x ) implies that Vh0 (p) > Vh0 (δ x ).
One example of V is a collection of expected CRRA utilities with history-dependent coefficient of
relative risk aversion, V = {E(x1−ρ h |·)}h∈H . Another example is a collection of expected CARA
utilities, V = {E(1 − e−λ h x |·)}h∈H . In these two cases, history-dependent risk aversion is captured
by a single parameter.
The DM uses the collection V and his history assignment a to recursively calculate the value
of each three-stage lottery. Formally, for p ∈ L 1 and h ∈ H, let CEh (p) be the certainty equivalent
of p calculated using Vh ; that is, Vh (δ CEh (p) ) = Vh (p). Given P3 ∈ L 3 , the DM first replaces
each terminal one-stage lottery with its certainty equivalent given the history assignment. This
results in a two-stage lottery P̃2 . Note that each two-stage sublottery of P3 is transformed into
a terminal one-stage lottery (over certainty equivalents) in P̃2 . The DM then replaces each such
one-stage lottery in P̃2 with its certainty equivalent, given the history assignment of the two-stage
7

sublottery in P3 from which it arose. This procedure reduces P̃2 into a one-stage lottery P̃1 , which
the DM evaluates using V0 . Figure 1 illustrates this procedure for the previous example where
P3 = h.5, P12 ; .5, P22 i, P12 = h.25, p; .5, q; .25, ri, and P22 = δ s . Suppose the DM considers the left
branch P12 elating (e), the right branch P22 disappointing (d), and, within P12 , considers r elating
(ee) but p and q disappointing (ed). Letting P̃11 = h.25,CEed (p); .5,CEed (q); .25,CEee (r)i and
P̃21 = h1,CEd (s)i, the DM first reduces P3 to P̃2 = h.5, P̃11 ; .5, P̃21 i, as seen in Figure 1(b); and then
reduces P̃2 to the one-stage lottery P̃1 = h.5,CEe (P̃11 ); .5,CEd (P̃21 )i, as seen in Figure 1(c). Finally,
the value of P3 is given by V0 (P̃1 ) (and its certainty equivalent is CE0 (P̃1 )).
Our model of history-dependent risk attitude requires the history assignments the DM uses to
be internally consistent. Roughly speaking, if a sublottery is considered elating (disappointing),
then its certainty equivalent should indeed be weakly larger than (strictly smaller than) the certainty equivalent of the sublottery from which it emanates. In other words, the certainty equivalent
of the parent lottery serves as the disappointment-elation threshold.5 More precisely, denote by
CE(·; a, V ) the recursively-calculated certainty equivalent of a sublottery. For t = 1, 2, a necessary
condition for Ptj to be an elating outcome of its parent lottery Pt+1 = hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i, is that


CE(Ptj ; a, V ) ≥ CEa(Pt+1 ) hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i .
That is, at the history a(Pt ), the DM prefers the sublottery Ptj to the compound lottery Pt . Similarly,
for Ptj to be a disappointing outcome of Pt+1 , it must be that


CE(Ptj ; a, V ) < CEa(Pt+1 ) hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i .
Summarizing the discussion so far, the HDRA model is defined as follows in this simple setting.
Definition 2 (History-dependent risk attitude, HDRA). An HDRA representation over three-stage
lotteries consists of a collection V := {Vh }h∈H of expected utility functions over one-stage lotteries (rankable in terms of risk aversion) and a history assignment a, such that for each P3 ∈ L 3 ,
the value of P3 is calculated recursively and the history assignment of each sublottery is internally
consistent. We describe a DM with an HDRA representation by the pair (V , a).
It is easy to see that the HDRA model is ordinal in nature: the ranking over three-stage lotteries
5 We

assume a DM considers an outcome of a nondegenerate lottery elating if its certainty equivalent is at least as
large as the certainty equivalent of the parent lottery. Alternatively, it would not affect our results if we instead assume
an outcome is disappointing if its certainty equivalent is at least as small as the certainty equivalent of the parent
lottery, or even introduce a third assignment, neutral (n), which treats the case of equality differently than elation or
disappointment. In any case, a generic nonempty history consists of a sequence strict elations and disappointments.
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induced by the HDRA model is invariant to increasing, potentially different transformations of
each of the members in the collection V . The reason is that the HDRA model takes into account
only the certainty equivalents of sublotteries after each history h.
In the HDRA model, the DM’s risk attitudes depend on the prior sequence of disappointments
and elations, but not on the “intensity” of those experiences. That is, the DM is affected only
by his general impressions of past experiences. This simplification of histories can be viewed as
an extension of the notions of elation and disappointment for one-stage lotteries suggested in Gul
(1991) or Chew (1989). In those works, a prize x is an elating outcome of a lottery p if it is preferred
to p itself, and is a disappointing outcome if p is preferred to it. In the HDRA model described here,
the same notion is applied recursively throughout the compound lottery to classify sublotteries as
elating or disappointing. While the classification of a realization is binary, the probabilities and
magnitudes of realizations determine the threshold for elation and disappointment, and in general
affect the value of the lottery. By permitting risk attitude to depend only on prior elations and
disappointments, this specification allows us to study endogenously evolving risk attitudes under a
parsimonious departure from history independence. Behaviorally, such a classification of histories
may also describe a cognitive limitation on the part of the DM. The DM may find it easier to recall
whether he was disappointed or elated, than whether he was very disappointed or slightly elated.
Keeping track of the “exact” intensity of disappointment and elation for each realization – which
is itself a compound lottery – may be difficult, leading the DM to classify his impressions into
discrete categories: sequences of elations and disappointments.6
Returning to our previous example, we illustrate the internal consistency requirement. Recall
that P̃1 = h.25,CEed (p); .5,CEed (q); .25,CEee (r)i is the recursively constructed sublottery lottery
where the one-stage lotteries p, q, r are replaced with their history-dependent certainty equivalents.
To verify that it is internally consistent for r to be elating and for p and q to be disappointing when
P11 is elating, one must check that
CEed (p),CEed (q) < CEe (P̃1 ) ≤ CEee (r).
6A

stylized assumption in the model is that the DM treats a period which is completely riskless differently than a
period in which any amount of risk resolves. This implies, in particular, that receiving a lottery with probability one is
treated discontinuously differently than receiving a “nearby” sublottery with elating and disappointing outcomes. This
simplifying assumption may be descriptively plausible in situations as described above, where the DM only recalls
whether he was disappointed, elated, or neither (since he was not exposed to any risk). Alternatively, this may relate
to situations where emotions are triggered by the mere “possibility” of risk (see a discussion of the phenomenon of
“probability neglect” in Sunstein (2002)).
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Finally, to verify that P11 is indeed elating and P22 is disappointing, one must check that
CEd (s) < CE0 (.5,CEe (P̃1 ); .5,CEd (s)) ≤ CEe (P̃1 ).
Observe that internal consistency imposes a fixed point requirement that takes into account the entire history assignment for P3 . Even if p, q, and r have an internally consistent history assignment
within P12 , this history assignment must also lead to a certainty equivalent for P12 which will be elating relative to CEd (s). In the next section, we explore the strong implications internal consistency
has for risk attitudes.
In the HDRA model, it is possible for two DM’s to have the same collection of utilities V but
to disagree on what outcomes are elating and disappointing. In other words, the rule for picking
among multiple internally consistent history assignments may vary across individuals. In Section
3.5, we suggest some plausible rules for generating the history assignment a, and connect them
to the DM’s risk attitude over compound lotteries. As pointed out in Section 1.2, the multiplicity
of possible history assignments, and the use of an assignment rule to pick among them, resembles
the multiplicity of possible beliefs in Köszegi and Rabin (2009), and their use of the “preferred
personal equilibrium” criterion.
We conclude this section by previewing how the components of this basic model will be extended in Section 5. (The extension allowing the DM to to take intermediate actions is given in
Section 4). First, the number of periods can be any finite number T . Second, while we keep requiring that members of V are rankable in term of risk aversion, they need not be expected utility
preferences. The collection V may consist of members from the betweenness class of preferences (Dekel (1986), Chew (1989), which includes popular non-expected utility preferences such
as Gul’s (1991) model of disappointment aversion. Lastly, we introduce a new component, the
threshold rule, which generalizes how the DM determines which realizations are elating or disappointing. The basic model in this section uses the DM’s preference at the parent lottery to determine the threshold for elation or disappointment. We refer to this threshold rule as endogenous. In
the more general model, we allow the threshold rule, denoted τ, to be exogenous. For example, in
an expectation-based threshold rule, where τ(·|Pt+1 ) = E(·), internal consistency requires that if
the DM considers Ptj to be elating in Pt+1 = hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i, then it must be that
CE(Ptj ; a, V



t
t
) ≥ E hα 1 ,CE(P1 ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pn ; a, V )i .

10

Similarly, if the DM considers Ptj disappointing in Pt+1 , it must be that


CE(Ptj ; a, V ) < E hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i .

3

Properties of history-dependent risk attitude

In this section, we study implications of the HDRA model. First, we show that the existence of an
HDRA representation implies regularity properties on V that are related to well-known cognitive
biases; and that in turn, these properties imply the existence of HDRA. (The extension of this result
for the more general setting appears in Section 5.) We then discuss several phenomena that arise.
3.1

The reinforcement and primacy effects

Experimental evidence suggests that an individual’s risk attitudes depend on how prior risk resolved. The literature suggests that people’s risk attitudes are reinforced by prior experiences: they
become less risk averse after positive experiences and more risk averse after negative ones. This
effect is captured in the following definition.
Definition 3. V = {Vh }h∈H displays the reinforcement effect if Vhd >RA Vhe for h ∈ {0, e, d}.
A body of evidence also suggests that individuals are affected by the position of items in a
sequence. One well-documented cognitive bias is the primacy effect, according to which early
observations have a strong effect on later judgments. In our setting, the order in which elations
and disappointments occur affect the DM’s risk attitude. The reinforcement effect suggests that
after an initial elation, a disappointment increases the DM’s risk aversion; and that after an initial
disappointment, an elation reduces the DM’s risk aversion. The primacy effect further suggests
that the shift in attitude from the initial realization has a lasting and disproportionate effect. This
means that future elation or disappointment can mitigate, but not overpower, the first impression,
as in the following definition.
Definition 4. V = {Vh }h∈H displays the primacy effect if Vde >RA Ved .
The reinforcement effect and primacy effects imply that, comparing any two histories of the
same length, the DM is more risk averse the earlier he is disappointed. That is, the reinforcement
and primacy effects correspond to the lexicographic orderings Vd >RA Ve and Vdd >RA Vde >RA

11

Ved >RA Vee . The following result links these cognitive biases to necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of an HDRA representation.7
Theorem 1 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for HDRA). An HDRA representation (V , a)
exists – that is, there exists an internally consistent assignment a – if and only if V displays the
reinforcement and primacy effects.
As seen in Definition 2, the HDRA model takes as given a collection of expected utility preferences V which are ranked in terms of risk aversion, but does not specify how they are ranked.
Theorem 1 shows that the internal consistency requirement places strong restrictions on how risk
aversion evolves with elations and disappointments. We sketch below the main steps of the proof;
formally, the result is a special case of Theorem 4 (in Section 5), which is proved in Appendix A.
Sketch of proof. We first describe an algorithm for finding an internally consistent assignment
when V displays the reinforcement and primacy effects. Consider first a two-stage lottery P =
hα 1 , p1 ; . . . ; α n , pn i. Assume p1 has the highest CEe (·) among all pi ’s, pn has the lowest CEd (·)
among p2 , . . . , pn , and CEe (pi ) > CEe (pi+1 ) for i = 1, . . . , n − 2. Initially set p1 to be elating
and p j to be disappointing for j > 1. If this assignment is internally consistent, we are done. If
not, consider p2 . If CEd (p2 ) ≥ CE0 (hα 1 ,CEe (p1 ); α 2 ,CEd (p2 ); . . . ; α n ,CEd (pn )i), switch p2 to
an elation and replace CEd (p2 ) with CEe (p2 ) above. One key observation is that the threshold
of any lottery increases by less than an increase in one of its prizes. Hence we know CEe (p2 ) ≥
CE0 (hα 1 ,CEe (p1 ); α 2 ,CEe (p2 ); . . . ; α n ,CEd (pn )i). If this new assignment is internally consistent,
we are done; otherwise, repeat this procedure on p3 , and so on and so forth. The second key
observation is that by the ordering of the pi ’s, the assignment of previous pi ’s remains intact. If
we reach pn , the resulting assignment can be shown to be internally consistent. This procedure
extends to a three-stage lottery hα 1 , P12 ; . . . ; α n , Pn2 i, if CEe (P̃i1 ) > CEd (P̃i1 ) for any assignment
within a nondegenerate Pi2 , where P̃i1 is derived by replacing all terminal lotteries in Pi2 with their
certainty equivalents. But this property follows from the reinforcement and primacy effects.
Next, to show necessity of the reinforcement effect, consider a nondegenerate one-stage lottery
p. Suppose, by contradiction, that Ve >RA Vd , which means that CEe (p) < CEd (p). Pick any
x ∈ (CEe (p),CEd (p)) and consider P3 = hα, δ p ; 1 − α, δ 2x i. Since CEe (p) < x, δ p cannot be an
elating outcome in P3 . Similarly, since CEd (p) ≥ x, δ p cannot be a disappointing outcome in P3 .
7 To

have the most concise statement of our results, we ruled out the standard case of history independence by
requiring the Vh ’s to be ranked in terms of risk aversion. However, for the standard model, the existence of an internally
consistent assignment is trivial: any assignment is consistent, because history does not affect valuations.
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Therefore, P3 would have no internally consistent assignment. To prove that Ved >RA Vee we may
use a lottery of the form hα, hβ , p; 1 − β , δ x i; 1 − α, δ 2w i; similarly for Vdd >RA Vde .
Finally, we sketch necessity of the primacy effect. The reinforcement effect implies that
CEd (h.5, b; .5, wi) < CEe (h.5, b; .5, wi); pick any lottery p whose support lies in this interval and
consider P2 = hα, δ b ; 1 − 2α, p; α, δ w i. Suppose P2 is an elating sublottery of some P3 . To determine whether p is elating or disappointing in P2 , we must compare the values of CEh (p) and
CEe (hα, b; 1 − 2α,CEh (p); α, wi), where h is either ee or ed. By properties of expected utility, this
reduces to comparing CEh (p) with CEe (h.5, b; .5, wi). Since CEh (p) is in between the elation and
disappointment values of h.5, b; .5, wi, p must be disappointing if P2 is elating, and elating if P2 is
disappointing. Suppose, by contradiction, that Ved >RA Vde . If P2 is recursively reduced to P̃1 , then

for small α, CEe (P̃1 ) ' CEed (p) < CEde (p) ' CEd (P̃1 ). But then for any x ∈ CEe (P̃1 ),CEd (P̃1 ) ,
the three-stage lottery hβ , P2 , 1 − β , δ 2x i has no internally consistent history assignment.
3.2

Preferring to lose late rather than early: the “second serve” effect

A recent New York Times article8 documents a widespread phenomenon in professional tennis: to
avoid a double fault after missing the first serve, many players employ a “more timid, perceptibly
slower” second serve that is likely to get the ball in play but leaves them vulnerable in the subsequent rally. In the article, Daniel Kahneman attributes this to the fact that “people prefer losing
late to losing early.” Kahneman says that “a game in which you have a 20 percent chance to get to
the second stage and an 80 percent chance to win the prize at that stage. . .is less attractive than a
game in which the percentages are reversed.” Such a preference was first noted in Ronen (1973).
To study this idea formally within the HDRA model, let us take α ∈ (.5, 1) and any two prizes
H > L. How does the two-stage lottery Pll2 = hα, h1 − α, H; α, Li; 1 − α, δ L i, where the DM has
a good chance of delaying losing, compare with Ple2 = h1 − α, hα, H; 1 − α, Li; α, δ L i, where the
DM is likely to lose earlier? (For simplicity we need only consider two stages here, but to embed
this into L 3 we may either raise the power on each δ by one, or consider each of Pll2 and Ple2 as
a sublottery evaluated under a history h ∈ {0, e, d}). The standard expected utility model predicts
indifference over Pll2 and Ple2 , because the distribution over final outcomes is the same. To examine
the predictions of the HDRA model, let uh denote the Bernoulli utility corresponding to expected
utility function Vh . Note that in both lotteries, reaching the final stage is elating under the HDRA
model, since H > L. Then, the HDRA value of Pll2 is higher than the value of Ple2 starting from
8 See

“Benefit of Hitting Second Serve Like the First,” August 29, 2010, available for download at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/sports/tennis/30serving.html?pagewanted=all.
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history h if and only if
 

−1
αuh uhe (1 − α)uhe (H)+αuhe (L) + (1 − α)uh (L) >
 

(1 − α)uh u−1
αu
(H)
+
(1
−
α)u
(L)
+ αuh (L).
he
he
he

(1)

Proposition 1. The DM prefers losing late to losing early (that is, Equation (1) holds for all H > L,
α ∈ (.5, 1) and h ∈ {0, e, d}) if and only if Vhe <RA Vh .
Proof. See Appendix A, where we show that Equation (1) is equivalent to uh being a concave
transformation of uhe .
Analogously, one can show the equivalence between preferring to win sooner rather than later,
and Vhd >RA Vh .
3.3

Nonmonotonic behavior: thrill of winning and pain of losing

A DM with an HDRA representation may violate first-order stochastic dominance for certain compound lotteries. For example, if α is very high, the lottery hα, δ p ; 1 − α, δ 2w i may be preferred to
hα, δ p ; 1 − α, δ 2b i; in the former, p is evaluated as an elation, while in the latter, it is evaluated as
a disappointment. Because the prizes w and b are received with very low probability, the “thrill
of winning” the lottery p may outweigh the “pain of losing” the lottery p. This arises from the
reinforcement effect on compound risks. While monotonicity with respect to compound first-order
stochastic dominance may be normatively appealing, the appeal of such monotonicity is rooted
in the assumption of consequentialism (that “what might have been” does not matter). As Mark
Machina points out, once consequentialism is relaxed, as is explicitly done in this paper, violations
of monotonicity may naturally occur.9 In our model, violations of monotonicity arise only on particular compound risks, in situations where the utility gain or loss from a change in risk attitude
outweighs the benefit of a prize itself. The idea that winning is enjoyable and losing is painful
may also translate to nonmonotonic behavior in more general settings. For example, Lee and Malmendier (2011) show that forty-two percent of auctions for board games end at a price which is
higher than the simultaneously available buy-it-now price.
9 As

discussed in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Machina offers the example of a DM who would rather
take a trip to Venice than watch a movie about Venice, and would rather watch the movie than stay home. Due to the
disappointment he would feel watching the movie in the event of not winning the trip itself, Machina points out that
the DM might prefer a lottery over the trip and staying home, to a lottery over the trip and watching the movie.
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3.4

Statistically reversing risk attitudes

Another implication of the reinforcement effect is statistically reversing risk attitudes: disappointment is more likely after elation, and vice versa. Greater risk aversion means that each one-stage
lottery has a lower certainty equivalent. Using our notions of disappointment and elation, for any
nondegenerate p ∈ L 1 , and h, h0 such that Vh >RA Vh0 , whenever a prize x is (i) disappointing in p
under Vh , then it is disappointing in p under Vh0 , and (ii) elating in p under Vh0 , then it is elating in
p under Vh . This feature implies that a DM who has been elated is not only less risk averse than
if he had been disappointed, but also has a higher elation threshold. In other words, the reinforcement effect implies that after a disappointment, the DM is more risk averse and “settles for less”;
whereas after an elation, the DM is less risk averse and “raises the bar.” Therefore, the probability
of elation in any sublottery increases if that sublottery is disappointing instead of elating.10
3.5

Optimism and pessimism

In the HDRA model, it is possible for two individuals to have the same collection of utilities V but
to disagree on what outcomes are elating and disappointing. For example, consider the two-stage
lottery hα, p; 1 − α, δ x i and suppose that CEe (p) > x > CEd (p). In this case, it would be internally
consistent for the lottery p to be either elating or disappointing. The value of a lottery depends on
the DM’s history assignment a, which in turn is revealed by his choice behavior (see Section 5).
In this section, we define notions of optimism and pessimism that are behaviorally related to the
DM’s risk attitude over compound lotteries.
Definition 5. Given a collection V , the DM is an optimist (pessimist) if for each P3 he selects the
internally consistent history assignment a that maximizes (minimizes) the HDRA utility of P3 . If
V A , V B are ordinally equivalent then (V A , aA ) is more optimistic than (V B , aB ) if CE(P3 ; aA , V A ) ≥
CE(P3 ; aB , V B ) for each P3 , with at least one strict comparison.
When multiple internally consistent assignments are possible, the optimist selects the most
favorable interpretation of events and the pessimist selects the least favorable one. To tie Definition
5 to choice behavior, we begin by considering a class of compound lotteries Lu3 under which the
history assignment is unambiguous. In words, Lu3 consists of compound lotteries where in each
10 The psychological literature,

in particular Parducci (1995) and Smith, Diener and Wedell (1989), provides support
for the prediction that elation thresholds increase (decrease) after positive (negative) experiences. Summarizing these
works, Schwarz and Strack (1998) observe that “an extreme negative (positive) event increased (decreased) satisfaction
with subsequent modest events....Thus, the occasional experience of extreme negative events facilitates the enjoyment
of the modest events that make up the bulk of our lives, whereas the occasional experience of extreme positive events
reduces this enjoyment.”
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Figure 2: Possible HDRA utilities of P3 (ω) are pictured on the vertical axis for each ω ∈ (0, 1) on
1−ρ
the horizontal axis, given CRRA utilities Vh = E( x1−ρ h ; ·), where ρ e = 0, ρ 0 = 1/4, ρ d = 1/2. The
h
sublottery p(ω) can be viewed as an elation or a disappointment in the range [ω, ω].
of the first two stages, either the DM learns he will receive an extreme prize (b or w) or must incur
further risk. Formally,
Lu3



1
= hα 1 , hα 2 , p; 1 − α 2 , z2 i; 1 − α 1 , z1 i | p ∈ L , zi ∈ {b, w} and α i ∈ [0, 1] .

For example, if z1 = b and z2 = w, then upon reaching p the DM would have been disappointed in
the first stage and elated in the second.11
Consider two HDRA preferences A and B over three-stage lotteries. Extending the standard
comparative notion of risk aversion, we say that A is less risk averse over compound lotteries than
B if for any P3 ∈ L 3 and x ∈ X, P3 B δ 3x implies P3 A δ 3x , with at least one strict comparison.12
Proposition 2. Let A and B be HDRA preferences over L 3 arising from (V A , aA ) and (V B , aB ).
(i) A and B agree on Lu3 if and only if V A and V B are ordinally equivalent.
(ii) A is more optimistic than B if and only if A and B agree on Lu3 and A is less risk
averse over compound lotteries than B .
Proof. Part (i) follows from applying the model on Lu3 ; part (ii) follows from the definition.
It follows immediately from part (ii) that A is an optimist (pessimist) if and only if A is less
(more) risk averse over compound lotteries than any preference B arising from an HDRA representation (V B , aB ) and which agrees with A on Lu3 . Figure 2 illustrates this distinction between
11 Whenever

α i = 1, the DM does not learn anything and the history assignment is unchanged.
any P3 , let E(P3 ) be the expected value of the probability distribution over final outcomes induced by P3 . The
DM is risk averse over compound lotteries if for all P3 , he prefers the sure outcome E(P3 ) to P3 .
12 For
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optimism and pessimism, depicting for each ω ∈ (0, 1) all possible HDRA values of the lottery
P3 (ω) = 1, P2 (ω) , where P2 (ω) = h 31 , δ 1 ; 13 , δ 2 ; 13 , p(ω)i and p(ω) = hω, 3; 1 − ω, 0i, using a
CRRA collection V . An increase in ω is a first-order stochastic improvement of p(ω). While
p(ω) is unambiguously elating (disappointing) for high (low) values of ω, there is an intermediate
range [ω, ω] where p(ω) can be viewed either as an elation or as a disappointment. The optimist
views p(ω) as an elation as soon as possible (for all ω ≥ ω), while the pessimist views p(ω) as a
disappointment for as long as possible (for all ω ≤ ω). In the range of ω’s where they disagree,
there are sure outcomes that the pessimist prefers to the risky lottery P2 (ω), while the optimist
prefers to face the risk.

4

Extension to intermediate actions, and a dynamic asset pricing problem

In this section, we extend our previous results to settings where the DM may take intermediate
actions while risk resolves. We then apply the model to a three-period asset pricing problem to
examine the impact of history-dependent risk attitude on prices.
4.1

HDRA with intermediate actions

In the HDRA model with intermediate actions, the DM categorizes each realization of a dynamic
(stochastic) decision problem – which is a choice set of shorter dynamic decision problems – as
elating or disappointing. He then recursively evaluates all the alternatives in each choice problem
based on the preceding sequence of elations and disappointments.
Formally, for any set Z, let K(Z) be the set of finite, nonempty subsets of Z. A one-stage
decision problem is simply a one-stage lottery; we write D 1 = L 1 . The set of finite, nonempty
sets of one-stage decision problems is given by A 1 = K(D 1 ). The set of two-stage decision
problems is thus D 2 = L (A 1 ). The set of finite, nonempty sets of two-stage decision problems is
A 2 = K(D 2 ). The DM’s domain of choice is D 3 = L (A 2 ).
The set of possible histories H and collection of expected utility preferences V = {Vh }h∈H
are the same as before, with the understanding that histories now refer to choice nodes. For each
P3 ∈ D 3 , the history assignment a(·|P3 ) maps each choice set in P3 (an element of A 1 ∪ A 2 ) to a
history in H that describes the preceding sequence of elations and disappointments. We initialize
a(P3 |P3 ) = 0. The DM recursively evaluates decision problems in the following way. Given a
three-stage decision problem P3 and a history assignment a(·|P3 ) over decision problems, the DM
first replaces each terminal one-stage decision problem A1 ∈ A 1 with max p∈A1 CEa(A1 |P3 ) (p). This
results in a two-stage decision problem P̃2 . Note that each original choice set A2 ∈ A 2 of two17

stage decision problems is transformed in P̃2 into a terminal choice set Ã1 consisting of one-stage
lotteries over certainty equivalents. The DM then replaces each such terminal choice set in P̃2 with
max p∈Ã1 CEa(A2 |P3 ) (p). This reduces P̃2 into a one-stage lottery P̃1 , which he evaluates using V0 .
In summary, the history assignment of a choice set determines the one-stage utility Vh used to
evaluate each (recursively reduced) one-stage decision problem inside it. The value of a choice
set is the maximal value of those (recursively reduced) one-stage decision problems. As before,
the history assignment of choice sets must be internally consistent. That is, for Atj to be an elating
(disappointing) outcome of Pt+1 = hα 1 , At1 ; . . . ; α n , Atn i, where Pt+1 ∈ At+1 , then we must have
CE(Atj ; a, V ) ≥ (<) CEa(At+1 ) (hα 1 ,CE(At1 ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Atn ; a, V )i). The definition of HDRA
is almost the same as before.
Definition 6 (HDRA with intermediate actions). An HDRA representation over three-stage decision problems consists of a collection V := {Vh }h∈H of expected utility functions over one-stage
lotteries (rankable in terms of risk aversion) and a history assignment a such that for each P3 ∈ D 3 ,
the value of P3 is calculated recursively and the history assignment of each choice set is internally
consistent.
Observe that the DM is “sophisticated” under HDRA with intermediate actions. From any
future choice set, the DM anticipates selecting the best continuation decision problem. That choice
leads to an internally consistent history assignment of that choice set. When reaching a choice set,
the single-stage utility he uses to evaluate the choices therein is the one he anticipated using, and
his choice is precisely his anticipated choice. Internal consistency is thus a stronger requirement
than before, because it takes optimal choices into account. However, our previous result extends.
Theorem 2 (Extension to intermediate actions). An HDRA representation with intermediate actions (V , a) exists if and only if V displays the reinforcement and primacy effects.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.2

A three-period asset pricing problem

We now apply the HDRA model with intermediate actions to a three period asset-pricing problem
in a representative-agent economy. We show that the model yields predictable, path-dependent
prices that exhibit excess volatility arising from actual and anticipated changes in risk aversion.
In each period t = 1, 2, 3, there are two assets traded, one safe and one risky. At the end of the
period, the risky asset yields ỹ, which is equally likely to be High (H) or Low (L). The second is
a risk-free asset returning R = 1 + r, where r is the risk-free rate of return. Asset returns are in the
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form of a perishable consumption good that cannot be stored; it must be consumed in the current
period. Each agent is endowed with one share of the risky asset in each period. The realization of
the risky asset in period t is denoted yt . In the beginning of each period t > 1, after a sequence of
realizations (y1 , . . . , yt−1 ), each agent can trade in the market, at price P(y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) for the risky
asset, with the risk-free asset being the numeraire. At t = 1, there are no previous realizations
and the price is simply denoted P. At the end of each period, the DM learns the realization of ỹ
and consumes the perishable return. The payoff at each terminal node of the three-stage decision
problem is the sum of per-period consumptions.13 The decision problem of the representative agent
in each period t is to determine the share α(y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) of property rights to retain on his unit of
risky asset given (y1 , . . . , yt−1 ). The agent is purchasing additional shares when α(y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) > 1,
and is short-selling when α(y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) < 0.
The representative agent has HDRA preferences with underlying CARA utilities; that is, the
Bernoulli function after history h is uh (x) = 1 − e−λ h x . The CARA specification means that our
results will not arise from wealth effects. For this section, we use the following simple parametrization of the agent’s coefficients of absolute risk aversion. Consider a, b satisfying 0 < a < 1 < b
and λ 0 > 0. In the first period, elation scales down the agent’s risk aversion by a2 , while disappointment scales it up by b2 . In the second period, elation scales down the agent’s current risk
aversion by a, while disappointment scales it up by b. In summary, λ e = a2 λ 0 , λ d = b2 λ 0 , λ ee =
a3 λ 0 , λ ed = a2 bλ 0 , λ de = b2 aλ 0 , and λ dd = b3 λ 0 . This parametrization satisfies the reinforcement and primacy effects, and has the feature that λ h ∈ (λ he , λ hd ) for all h.
As can be seen from our analysis below, if the agent’s risk aversion is independent of history
and fixed at λ 0 at every stage, then the asset price is constant over time. By contrast, in the HDRA
model, prices depend on past realizations of the asset, even though past and future realizations are
statistically independent. The following result formalizes the predictions of the HDRA model.
Theorem 3. Under the HDRA model given the parametrization above, the price moves in response
to past realizations as follows:
(i) P(H, H) > P(H, L) > P(L, H) > P(L, L) at t = 3.
(ii) P(H) > P(L) at t = 2.
(iii) Price increases after each High realization: P(H, H) > P(H) > P(0) and P(L, H) > P(L).
(iv) The prices P(0), P(L), and P(L, L) are all below the (constant) price under history independent risk aversion λ 0 .
13 Alternatively,

one could let the terminal payoff be some function of the consumption vector, in which case the
agent is evaluating lotteries over terminal utility instead of total consumption.
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Proof. A partial proof is provided in the text below. For omitted details, see Appendix B.
Theorem 3 is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the simulated price path for the specification
λ 0 = .005, b = 1.2, a = .8, H = 20 and L = 0.14 In that case, the price also decreases after each Low
realization: P(0) > P(L) > P(L, L) and P(H) > P(H, L).15 In general, this need not be true. Notice
that the DM faces one fewer stage of risk each time there is a realization of the asset. Nonetheless, price is constant with history-independent CARA preferences. With history-dependent risk
aversion, a compound risk may become even riskier due to the fact that the continuation certainty
equivalents fluctuate with risk aversion. That is, expected future risk aversion movements introduce an additional source of risk, causing price volatility. The price after each history is a convex
combination of H and L, with weights that depend on the product of current risk aversion and the
spread between the future certainty equivalents (as seen in Table 1). Depending on how much risk
aversion fluctuates, there may be an upward trend in prices, simply from having fewer stages of
risk left. As will be seen in our analysis below, elation (High realizations) reinforces that trend,
because the agent is both less risk averse and faces fewer stages of risk. However, there is tension between these two forces after disappointment (Low realizations), because the agent is more
risk averse even though he faces a shorter horizon. One can find parameter values where the upward trend dominates, and Low realizations yield a (quantitatively very small) price increase –
while maintaining the rankings in Theorem 3. Intuitively, this occurs when disappointment has a
very weak effect on risk aversion (b ≈ 1) but elation has a strong effect, because then expected
variability in future risk aversion (hence expected variability in utility) prior to a realization may
overwhelm the small increase in risk aversion after a Low realization occurs.
We now discuss the proof of Theorem 3. We begin by illustrating how the agent uses the HDRA
model to rebalance his portfolio. To do this, we first solve the agent’s optimization problem under
the recursive application of one-stage preferences using an arbitrary history assignment, and later
find the internally consistent one. Since in equilibrium the representative agent must hold his initial
share of the asset, the first-order conditions from portfolio optimization pin down prices given a
history assignment.
14 Estimates

of CARA coefficients in the literature are highly variable, ranging from .00088 (Cohen and Einav
(2007)) to .0085 to .14 (see Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994) for a summary of estimates). Using λ 0 = .005, b = 1.2
and a = .8 yields CARA coefficients between .0025 and .00864.
15 Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) propose and calibrate a model where investors have linear loss aversion preferences and derive gain-loss utility only over fluctuations in financial wealth. In our model, introducing consumption
shocks would induce shifts in risk aversion. They assume that the amount of loss aversion decreases with a statistic that
depends on past stock prices. In their calibration, this leads to price increases (decreases) after good (bad) dividends
and high volatility.
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Figure 3: The predicted HDRA price path when λ 0 = .005, a = .8, b = 1.2, H = 20 and L = 0.

The agent’s optimization problem given a history assignment
We solve the agent’s problem by backward induction, denoting by h(y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) the agent’s history assignment after the sequence of realizations (y1 , . . . , yt−1 ) and later solving for the right
assignment. After the realizations (y1 , y2 ) but before learning y3 , the agent solves the problem:



max Eỹ3 uh(y1 ,y2 ) c(y1 ) + c(y2 |y1 ) + α(y1 , y2 )ỹ3 + (1 − α(y1 , y2 ))P(y1 , y2 )R ,

α(y1 ,y2 )

where c(y1 ) = αy1 + (1 − α)PR denotes the realized consumption in period 1 and c(y2 |y1 ) =
α(y1 )yt + (1 − α(y1 ))P(y1 )R denotes the realized consumption in period 2. Using the CARA
form, the first-order condition given y1 and y2 simplifies to
P(y1 , y2 )R =

exp(λ h(y1 ,y2 ) α(y1 , y2 )(H − L))
1
H+
L. (2)
1 + exp(λ h(y1 ,y2 ) α(y1 , y2 )(H − L))
1 + exp(λ h(y1 ,y2 ) α(y1 , y2 )(H − L))

Let α ∗ (y1 , y2 ) be the optimal choice and let c∗ (ỹ3 |y1 , y2 ) = α ∗ (y1 , y2 )ỹ3 +(1−α ∗ (y1 , y2 ))P(y1 , y2 )R
denote the optimal consumption plan for t = 3 given y1 and y2 .
We now introduce some useful notation. Given a one-dimensional random variable x̃ and a
function f of that random variable, we let Γx̃ (λ , f (x̃)) denote the certainty equivalent of f (x̃) given
CARA preferences with coefficient λ . That is,
h
i
1
Γx̃ (λ , f (x̃)) = − ln Ex̃ exp(−λ f (x̃)) .
λ
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Using this notation and the CARA functional form, the certainty equivalent CE(y1 , y2 ) of the
choice problem in t = 3 after (y1 , y2 ) is then:


CE(y1 , y2 ) = c(y1 ) + c(y2 |y1 ) + Γỹ3 λ h(y1 ,y2 ) , c∗ (ỹ3 |y1 , y2 ) ,
which is the sum of period-1 consumption, period-2 consumption, and the certainty equivalent of
period-3 optimal consumption given risk aversion λ h(y1 ,y2 ) .
Proceeding backwards, after observing y1 but before learning y2 , the agent solves the problem16
h

i
max Eỹ2 uh(y1 ) CE(y1 , ỹ2 ) ,

α(y1 )

where CE(y1 , y2 ), defined above, is a function of α(y1 ) through c(y2 |y1 ). Using the CARA form,
the first-order condition at t = 2 simplifies to
exp(λ h(y1 ) (CE(y1 , H) −CE(y1 , L)))
1
H+
L.
1 + exp(λ h(y1 ) (CE(y1 , H) −CE(y1 , L)))
1 + exp(λ h(y1 ) (CE(y1 , H) −CE(y1 , L)))
(3)
∗
∗
∗
∗
Let α (y1 ) be the optimal choice and denote by c (ỹ2 |y1 ) = α (y1 )ỹ2 + (1 − α (y1 ))P(y1 )R the
agent’s optimal consumption plan for t = 2 given y1 . The certainty equivalent CE(y1 ) of the choice
problem in t = 2 after the realization y1 is then:

P(y1 )R =

CE(y1 ) = c(y1 ) + Γỹ2

!


λ h(y1 ) , c∗ (ỹ2 |y1 ) + Γỹ3 λ h(y1 ,y˜2 ) , c∗ (ỹ3 |y1 , ỹ2 ) .



The random variable c∗ (ỹ2 |y1 ) + Γỹ3 λ h(y1 ,y˜2 ) , c∗ (ỹ3 |y1 , ỹ2 ) , which is a function of ỹ2 , is the sum
of period-2 optimal consumption and the certainty equivalent of period-3 optimal consumption
given risk aversion λ h(y1 ,ỹ2 ) . The term CE(y1 ) is simply the certainty equivalent of this random
variable given risk aversion λ h(y1 ) .
Should the agent choose to hold an initial share α of the risky asset, the value of the decision
problem the agent faces at t = 1 is given by Eỹ1 [u0 (CE(ỹ1 ))], where CE(y1 ) depends on α through
16 Note

that the t = 1, 2 problems fix future histories regardless of the choice of α and α(y1 ). Because period-3
prices will be such that the agent holds the asset at some positive level of risk aversion given (y1 , y2 ), we know that
P(y1 , y2 ) < R1 H+L
2 . In period 3, the agent is thus willing to hold some amount of the asset at any level of risk aversion.
This means that in periods t = 1, 2, even if the agent were hypothetically not to hold the asset, he would still be exposed
to risk at t = 1, 2 due to the influence on period-3 prices; hence the agent’s history is as specified.
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c(y1 ). The agent then chooses the optimal initial share α ∗ :
h 
i
max Eỹ1 u0 CE(ỹ1 ) .
α

Using the CARA form, and letting P be the initial price of the risky asset in period t = 1 prior to
any realizations, the first-order condition at t = 1 simplifies to
PR =

exp(λ 0 (CE(H) −CE(L)))
1
H+
L.
1 + exp(λ 0 (CE(H) −CE(L)))
1 + exp(λ 0 (CE(H) −CE(L)))

(4)

In view of (2), (3), and (4) and the fact that exp(·) ≥ 0, we conclude that all the P(y1 , . . . , yt−1 )R’s
are a convex combination of H and L, where the weights depend on the agent’s risk aversion
after the realizations y1 , . . . , yt−1 . To determine those levels of risk aversion, we use the equilibrium condition that the representative agent must optimally hold his per-period endowment of
one share of risky asset after any realization and given his history assignment. That is, we plug
α ∗ (y1 , y2 ) = α ∗ (y1 ) = α ∗ = 1 into the formulas for CE(y1 , y2 ) and CE(y1 ) and look for an internally consistent history assignment in order to deduce the equilibrium prices.
Verifying internal consistency of the history assignment
We now check that it is internally consistent for the agent to consider each High realization elating
and each Low realization disappointing (Lemma 6 in the Appendix shows that this is also the
unique internally consistent history assignment). We proceed recursively, fixing a realization y1 ∈
{L, H}. Being elated by y2 = H and disappointed by y2 = L is internally consistent if the resulting
certainty equivalents for the t = 3 choice problems satisfy

 1
1
CE(y1 , H) ≥ CEh(y1 ) h ,CE(y1 , H); ,CE(y1 , L)i > CE(y1 , L).
2
2
But this holds if and only if CE(y1 , H) > CE(y1 , L), which in turns holds if and only if
H + Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ3 ) > L + Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ3 ).

(5)

As λ increases, risk aversion increases and the certainty equivalent µ ỹ3 (λ , ỹ3 ) decreases. Hence
the reinforcement effect, or λ h(y1 )e < λ h(y1 )d , implies that Equation (5) must hold.
Proceeding backwards, observe that being elated by y1 = H and disappointed by y2 = L is
internally consistent if, similarly to our previous calculation, the resulting certainty equivalents for

23

the t = 2 choice problems satisfy CE(H) > CE(L). In turn, this holds if and only if




H + Γỹ2 λ e , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(H,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 ) > L + Γỹ2 λ d , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(L,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 ) ,

(6)

where the history assignments above are h(H, H) = ee, h(H, L) = ed, h(L, H) = de, and h(L, L) =
dd. Using this, it is easy to compare the certainty equivalent Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 ,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 ) on each side of
Equation (6). By the primacy and reinforcement effects, λ ee < λ ed < λ de < λ dd . Thus, given any
realization of ỹ2 , the random variable ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 ,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 ) takes a larger value when y1 = H than
when y1 = L. Moreover, due to the reinforcement effect, the random variable is also evaluated
using a less risk-averse coefficient when y1 = H than when y1 = L. Hence Equation (6) must also
hold, and our proposed history assignment is internally consistent.
Implications for prices
Finally, we apply the results above to study prices. It is immediately clear from (2)-(4) that the
asset price would be constant over time in the standard setting, where risk aversion is history
independent. If risk aversion is fixed at λ 0 , then the price P̄ in the standard model would simply be


1
exp(λ 0 (H − L))
1
H+
L .
P̄ =
R 1 + exp(λ 0 (H − L))
1 + exp(λ 0 (H − L))
In the HDRA model, however, the asset price depends on y1 and y2 , not only through current risk
aversion, but also through the impact on future certainty equivalents. Setting α ∗ (y1 , y2 ) = α ∗ (y1 ) =
α ∗ = 1 in the first-order conditions
(2)-(4) and using the history assignmentin the result, the asset
price P(y1 , . . . , yt ) takes the form

1
R

1
1+exp( f (y1 ,...,yt ))

exp( f (y1 ,...,yt ))
H + 1+exp(
f (y ,...,yt )) L , where:
1

Realizations

Weight f (y1 , . . . , yt )

0
y1


λ 0 H − L + Γỹ2 (λ e , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(H,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 )) − Γỹ2 (λ d , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(L,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 ))

λ h(y1 ) H − L + Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ3 )

y1 , y2

λ h(y1 ,y2 ) (H − L)
Table 1: The weighting function f (y1 , . . . , yt ) for prices.

In all these cases, an increase in f (y1 , . . . , yt ) decreases the weight on H and thus decreases the
price of the asset. Since H > L, the ranking P(H, H) > P(H, L) > P(L, H) > P(L, L) in Theorem
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3(i) follows immediately from the reinforcement and primacy effects. The ranking P(H) > P(L)
in Theorem 3(ii) is proved in Lemma 7 in the Appendix. To see why some argument is required, notice that λ e < λ d is not sufficient to show that P(H) > P(L) unless we know something more about how the difference in the certainty equivalents of period-three consumption,
Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ3 ), compares after y1 = H versus y1 = L.
The rankings P(H, H) > P(H) and P(L, H) > P(L) in Theorem 3(iii) are easily seen using the
table above. First, the parameterization implies λ ee < λ e , and λ de < λ d . The proof is complete by
recalling that the term Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ3 ) is positive, as shown in our argument for
internal consistency. An additional step of proof, given in Lemma 8 of the Appendix, is needed to
show that P(H) > P(0). Similarly, Theorem 3(iv) follows from λ dd > λ d > λ 0 combined with the
fact that λ h always multiplies a term strictly larger than H − L. Hence the prices P(0), P(L), and
P(L, L) all fall below the price P̄ in the standard model with constant risk aversion λ 0 .

5

Generalization

In the basic version of the HDRA model studied in the previous sections, we confined our attention
to (i) three time periods, (ii) expected utility preferences in each stage, and (iii) a rule for classifying
disappointing and elating outcomes based on the DM’s endogenously changing preferences. In this
section, we present a model of history-dependent risk attitude that incorporates an arbitrary number
of time periods, a more general class of preferences in each stage, and a more general threshold
rule for determining disappointments and elations. We then extend our results on the evolution
of risk attitudes to this generalized setting, and describe how the primitives of the model may be
elicited from choice behavior.
T -stage lotteries
To simplify exposition, we present our results for T -stage lotteries; the extension to T -stage decision problems is immediate. Keeping the set of prizes X = [w, b] and the set of simple one-stage
lotteries L 1 as before, the set of T -stage lotteries, L T , is defined by the inductive relation L T =

L L T −1 for T ≥ 2. A typical element PT of L T has the form PT = α 1 , P1T −1 ; ...; α m , PmT −1 ,
where each PjT −1 ∈ L T −1 is a (T − 1)-stage lottery. If PjT −1 is the outcome of PT , then all remaining uncertainty is resolved according to PjT −1 . The degenerate lottery δ Tx ∈ L T gives the lottery
δ Tx −1 with probability one (i.e., x is received with probability one after T stages). We also use δ TPt−t
for the lottery where the t-stage sublottery Pt is received after T − t degenerate stages. As before,
a t-stage lottery Pt is a sublottery of PT if there is a sequence Pt+1 , Pt+2 , . . . , PT such that for every
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0

0

t 0 ∈ {t, . . . , T − 1}, Pt ∈ supp Pt +1 .
For any T -stage lottery PT , the initial history is empty – that is, a(PT |PT ) = 0. If a sublottery
is degenerate – i.e., it leads to some sublottery with probability one – then the DM is not exposed
to risk at that stage and his history is unchanged. If a sublottery is nondegenerate, each sublottery
in its support may be an elating (e) or disappointing (d) outcome. The DM’s history a(Pt |PT ) at
any sublottery Pt is the preceding sequence of e’s and d’s. The set of all possible histories is thus
H = {0} ∪

T[
−1

{e, d}t .

t=1

Each history h ∈ H corresponds to a utility function Vh : L 1 → R over one-stage lotteries.
Betweenness preferences
The DM may recursively apply continuous and monotone single-stage preferences 1 satisfying
the betweenness property: for all p, q ∈ L 1 and α ∈ [0, 1], p 1 q implies p 1 α p + (1 − α) q 1
q, where α p + (1 − α)q is the one-stage lottery which is the convex combination of p and q. Betweenness is a weakened form of the vNM-independence axiom. It implies neutrality towards
randomization among equally-good lotteries. Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986) show that a preference relation  satisfies continuity, monotonicity, and betweenness if and only if it has a utility
representation V such that each V (p) is defined implicitly as the unique v ∈ [0, 1] solving

∑ p (x) u (x, v) = v,

(7)

x

where u : X × [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous in both arguments, strictly increasing in the first argument, and satisfies u (w, v) = 0 and u (b, v) = 1 for all v∈ [0, 1]. The function u (x, v) can be
interpreted as the value of the prize x relative to a reference utility level v. This class contains
expected utility preferences, where u(x, v) ≡ u(x). Another well-known model in this class is Gul
(1991)’s theory of disappointment aversion,17 where the value V (p; β , u) of a lottery p is the unique
v solving
∑{x|u(x)≥v } p(x)u (x) + (1 + β ) ∑{x|u(x)<v } p(x)u (x)
.
(8)
v=
1 + β ∑{x|u(x)<v } p(x)
17 Gul’s

model was first intended to explain the Allais paradox. In a dynamic setting, it proved useful to address, for
example, the equity premium puzzle (Ang, Bekaert and Liu, 2005) and a statistically significant negative correlation
between volatility and private investment (Aizenman and Marion, 1999).
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That is, lotteries are evaluated by calculating their “expected utility,” except that disappointing outcomes (those that are worse than the lottery) get a uniformly greater (or smaller) weight depending
on β ∈ (−1, ∞).
As before, we require the utility functions after each history to be rankable in terms of risk
aversion. An example of an admissible class V with non-expected utility preferences is a collection
of disappointment aversion preferences with history-dependent β and history-independent utility
function over prizes; i.e., V = {V (·; β h , u)}h∈H , where V (·; β h , u) is given by (8). Indeed, Gul
(1991, Proposition 5) shows that the DM becomes increasingly risk averse as β increases, holding
fixed the utility function over prizes.
Threshold rules
Our model of history-dependent risk attitude requires the history assignment the DM uses to be
internally consistent. In the basic version of the model, we confined our attention to a preferencebased rule where a sublottery may be considered elating (disappointing) if its recursively-calculated
certainty equivalent is greater (smaller) than that of its parent lottery. Denote by CE(·; a, V ) the
certainty equivalent of a sublottery (of a T -stage compound lottery). Generalizing our earlier
notion, the DM may determine if Ptj is an elating or disappointing outcome of its parent lottery
Pt+1 = hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i by examining whether CE(Ptj ; a, V ) falls above or below a threshold
level which is a function of hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i. We consider two types of
threshold-generating rules different DM’s may use: an exogenous rule (independent of preference)
and an endogenous, preference based specification.
Exogenous threshold. Consider any function in the betweenness class (as in (7)) and let the
threshold rule τ : L 1 → R be its inverse (certainty equivalent) function. Internal consistency requires that if the DM considers Ptj to be elating in Pt+1 = hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i, then it must be that


t
t
t
CE(Pj ; a, V ) ≥ τ hα 1 ,CE(P1 ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pn ; a, V )i . If Ptj is disappointing in Pt+1 , then


CE(Ptj ; a, V ) < τ hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i .
Note that the function τ is independent of preferences, even though it takes as an input lotteries
that have been generated from the DM’s preference. One example is an expectation-based threshold rule where τ(·) = E(·), in which case the DM compares the certainty equivalent of a sublottery
to his expected certainty equivalent.
The other threshold rule studied is our earlier preference-based specification.
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Endogenous, preference-based threshold. The DM uses his preference at a sublottery to determine which realizations are elating or disappointing. The threshold rule τ is a collection of
preference-based thresholds where τ(· | Pt+1 ) : L 1 → R is the certainty equivalent under the DM’s
preference Va(Pt+1 ) (·) at Pt+1 ; under our earlier notation, τ(·|Pt+1 ) = CEh (·) where h = a(Pt+1 ).
Internal consistency requires that if the DM considers Ptj elating in Pt+1 = hα 1 , P1t ; . . . ; α n , Pnt i,


then CE(Ptj ; a, V ) ≥ CEa(Pt+1 ) hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i . If Ptj is disappointing in


Pt+1 , then it must be that CE(Ptj ; a, V ) < CEa(Pt+1 ) hα 1 ,CE(P1t ; a, V ); . . . ; α n ,CE(Pnt ; a, V )i .
To illustrate the difference between the endogenous and exogenous threshold rules, consider
a one-stage lottery that gives the prizes {0, 1, . . . , 1000} with equal probabilities. If the DM is
risk averse and uses the (endogenous) preference-based threshold rule, then he may be elated by
prizes smaller than 500, where the cutoff for elation is his certainty equivalent for this lottery.
By contrast, if he uses the exogenous threshold rule, then only prizes exceeding 500 are elating.
That is, exogenous threshold rules separate the classification of disappointment and elation from
preferences.
Generalized model of history-dependent risk attitude
The generalized model of history-dependent risk attitude combines the elements outlined above as
follows.
Definition 7 (History-dependent risk attitude, HDRA). An HDRA representation over T -stage
lotteries consists of a collection V := {Vh }h∈H of utilities over one-stage lotteries from the betweenness class (rankable in terms of risk aversion), a history assignment a, and an (endogenous
or exogenous) threshold rule τ, such that for each PT ∈ L T , the value of PT is calculated recursively and the history assignment of each sublottery is internally consistent given the threshold rule
τ. We identify a DM with an HDRA representation by the triple (V , a, τ) satisfying the above.
To formulate our characterization of HDRA in this setting, we extend Definitions 3 and 4 of the
reinforcement and primacy effects. For any t, let d t (or et ) denote t repetitions of d (or e). The history hed t , for instance, corresponds to experiencing one elation and t successive disappointments
after history h, under the implicit assumption that the resulting history is in H.
Definition 8. V = {Vh }h∈H displays the reinforcement effect if Vhd >RA Vhe for all h.
Definition 9. V = {Vh }h∈H displays the primacy effect if Vhdet >RA Vhedt for all h and t.
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History length

Veee Veed Vede Vedd
Ved

Vee
Lesser risk aversion

Vdee Vded Vdde Vddd
Vde

Vdd
Vd

Ve

Greater risk aversion

Figure 4: Starting from the bottom, each row depicts the risk aversion rankings >RA of the Vh for
histories of length t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T − 1. The reinforcement effect and the primacy effect imply the
lexicographic ordering in each row. The vertical boundaries and consecutive row alignment would
be implied by the additional assumption Vhd >RA Vh >RA Vhe for all h ∈ H.
The reinforcement and primacy effects together imply strong restrictions on the collection V ;
these are seen in the following observation. We refer below to the lexicographic order on histories
of the same length as the ordering where h̃ precedes h if it precedes it alphabetically. Since d comes
before e, this is interpreted as “the DM is disappointed earlier in h̃ than in h.”
Observation 1. V displays the reinforcement and primacy effects if and only if for h, h̃ of the same
length, Vh̃ >RA Vh if h̃ precedes h lexicographically. Moreover, under the additional assumption
Vhd >RA Vh >RA Vhe for all h ∈ H, V displays the reinforcement and primacy effects if and only if
for any h, h0 , h00 , we have Vhdh00 >RA Vheh0 .
The content of Observation 1 is visualized Figure 4. The first statement corresponds to the
lexicographic ordering across the rows. Under the additional assumption Vhd >RA Vh >RA Vhe ,
which says an elation reduces (and a disappointment increases) the DM’s risk aversion relative to
his initial level, one obtains the vertical lines and consecutive row alignment. Observe that along
a realized path, this imposes no restriction on how current risk aversion compares to risk aversion
two or more periods ahead when the continuation path consists of both elating and disappointing
outcomes: e.g., one can have both Vh <RA Vhed or Vh >RA Vhed .
We complete this section by generalizing our main characterization result and showing how
one may elicit the primitives (V , a, τ) from choice behavior. We begin with the following theorem,
which extends Theorem 1
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Theorem 4 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for HDRA). Consider V and an exogenous or
endogenous threshold rule τ. An HDRA representation (V , a, τ) exists – that is, there exists an internally consistent assignment a – if and only if V displays the reinforcement and primacy effects.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An immediate implication of Theorem 4 is that the recursively calculated certainty equivalent
of any t-stage sublottery is larger when the sublottery is considered elating, than when it is considered disappointing. In other words, the DM also exhibits less risk aversion over compound
lotteries (as defined in Section 3.5) after elation than after disappointment. The same feature arises
in the DM’s choices when intermediate actions are permitted; Theorem 4 readily extends, as before. A second implication of Theorem 4 under an endogenous threshold is statistically reversing
risk attitudes; this feature does not arise under exogenous threshold rules. As discussed in Section
3.4, when the threshold moves with preference, elation becomes more likely after disappointment
because the certainty equivalent of any lottery decreases (and vice-versa). The intensity of reversals in risk attitude may well persist, even under the additional assumption in Observation 1 that
Vhd >RA Vh >RA Vhe for all h. As visualized in Figure 4, this assumption means that after an elation,
the DM’s greatest possible degree of risk aversion in the future decreases; and conversely, after a
disappointment, the DM’s lowest possible degree of risk aversion in the future increases. However,
the “mood swings” of a DM with an endogenous threshold need not moderate with experience. To
see this, suppose for simplicity that the DM’s risk aversion in V is described by a collection of risk
aversion coefficients {ρ h }h∈H , and note that for any fixed time horizon T , the parameters need not
satisfy |ρ ed − ρ e | ≥ |ρ ede − ρ ed | ≥ |ρ eded − ρ ede | · · · .
In what follows, we discuss the question of elicitation – that is, how to recover the primitives
(V , a, τ) from the choice behavior of a DM who applies the HDRA model. While the utility functions in V are used to evaluate certainty equivalents in all T -stage lotteries, they may be elicited
using only choice behavior over a simple subclass of lotteries illustrated in Figure 5. Extending
the definition of Lu3 from Section 3.5, let
(
LuT =

hα 1 , hα 2 , · · · hα T −1 , p; 1 − α T −1 , δ zT −1 i · · · ; 1 − α 2 , δ Tz2−2 i; 1 − α 1 , δ Tz1−1 i
such that p ∈ L 1 , zi ∈ {b, w}, and α i ∈ [0, 1]

)

be the set of lotteries where in each period, either the DM learns he will receive one of the extreme
prizes b or w for sure, or he must incur further risk (which is ultimately resolved by p if an extreme
prize has not been received). For lotteries in the class LuT the history assignment is unambiguous.
The DM is disappointed by any continuation sublottery received instead of the best prize b, and
elated by any continuation sublottery received instead of the worst prize w. To illustrate how the
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Figure 5: A representative lottery in LuT , where zi ∈ {b, w} for all i = 1, . . . , T − 1 and p ∈ L 1 .
class LuT allows elicitation of V , consider a history h = (h1 , . . . , ht ) of length t ≤ T − 1. Pick
any sequence α 1 , . . . , α t ∈ (0, 1) and pick α i = 1 for i > t. (Note that anytime the continuation
probability α i is one, the history is unchanged). Construct the sequence z1 , . . . , zt such that for
every i ≤ t, zi = b if hi = d, and zi = w if hi = e. Finally, define `h : L 1 → LuT by `h (r) ≡
hα 1 , hα 2 , · · · hα t , r; 1 − α t , δ Tzt −t i · · · ; 1 − α 2 , δ Tz2−2 i; 1 − α 1 , δ Tz1−1 i for any r ∈ L 1 . It is easy to see
that the history assignment of r must be h. Moreover, under the HDRA model, Vh (p) ≥ Vh (q)
if and only if the DM prefers `h (p) to `h (q). As in our basic model, only the ordinal rankings
represented by the collection V affect choice behavior.
We may also elicit the DM’s (endogenous or exogenous) threshold rule τ from his choices. For
ease of exposition, we describe the elicitation procedure within a two-stage setting and under the
initial history. (More generally, one may embed this procedure in a T -stage setting, and after any
history h, using lotteries analogous to those in LuT but where the final one-stage lottery is replaced
with a two-stage lottery). Recall that τ is a function of one-stage lotteries. To determine how the
prize z compares to the threshold τ of a one-stage lottery hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i, it suffices to examine
the DM’s behavior over two-stage lotteries of the form:
α1
αn
1
P2 (p) ≡ h , p; , δ x1 ; . . . , , δ xn i, for p ∈ L 1 .
2
2
2
Suppose that for some nondegenerate p̄ ∈ L 1 satisfying CEe ( p̄) = z, the DM is indifferent between
P2 ( p̄) and P2 (δ z ). Under the HDRA model, it cannot be that p̄ is disappointing in P2 ( p̄), since
CEd ( p̄) < CEe ( p̄) implies the DM strictly prefers P2 ( p̄) to P2 (CEd ( p̄)) by monotonicity of his
one-stage preferences. Therefore, p̄ is elating in P2 ( p̄) and
1
α1
αn
z = CEe ( p̄) ≥ τ(h ,CEe ( p̄); , x1 ; . . . , , xn i).
2
2
2
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(9)

The one-stage lottery h 21 , z; α21 , x1 ; . . . , α2n , xn i) is a convex combination of the sure prize z and
hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i. Because τ is the certainty equivalent of a betweenness function, it satisfies
betweenness itself. Hence (9) holds if and only if z ≥ τ(hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i). Similarly, if for
some nondegenerate p ∈ L 1 satisfying CEd ( p̄) = z, the DM is indifferent between P2 (p) and
P2 (δ z ), then z < τ(hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i). We show in Appendix A.1 that there always exists such
a p̄ (or p) whenever z ≥ (<) τ(hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i). Thus, the auxiliary relation τ , defined by
z τ hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i (respectively, hα 1 , x1 ; . . . ; α n , xn i τ z) if there is a nondegenerate p ∈ L 1
such that P2 (p) ∼ P2 (δ z ) and CEe (p) = z (respectively, CEd (p) = z), represents τ’s comparisons
between a lottery and a sure prize. Appendix A.1 shows how to complete this relation using choice
over lotteries of the form P2 (·), and proves that it represents the threshold τ.
Finally, to recover the history assignment of a T -stage lottery, one needs to iteratively ask the
DM what sure outcomes should replace the terminal lotteries to keep him indifferent. Generically,
his chosen outcome must be the certainty equivalent of the corresponding sublottery under his
history assignment a.18

6

Conclusion and directions for further research

We propose a model of history-dependent risk attitude which has tight predictions for how disappointments and elations affect the attitude to future risks. The model permits a wide class of
preferences and threshold rules, and is consistent with a body of evidence on risk-taking behavior.
To study endogenous reference dependence under a minimal departure from recursive history
independent preferences, HDRA posits the categorization of each sublottery as either elating or
disappointing. The DM’s risk attitudes depend on the prior sequence of disappointments or elations, but not on the “intensity of those experiences.” As seen in the application to asset pricing,
this makes the model particularly easy to apply. It is possible to generalize our model so that the
more a DM is “surprised” by an outcome, the more his risk aversion shifts away from a baseline
level. The equivalence between the generalized model and the reinforcement and primacy effects
remains.19 Extending the model requires introducing an additional component (a sensitivity function capturing dependence on probabilities) and parametrizing risk aversion in the one-stage utility
functions using a continuous real variable. By contrast, allowing the size of risk aversion shifts
to depend on the magnitude of outcomes would be a more substantial change. Finding the history assignment involves a fixed point problem which would then become quite difficult to solve.
18 Since H is finite, if there is PT such that two assignments yield the same value, then there is an open ball around
PT within which every other lottery has the property that no two assignments yield the same value.
19 An appendix regarding this extension will be provided upon request.

32

Moreover, the testable implications of such a model depend on whether it is possible to identify the
extent to which a realization is disappointing or elating, as that designation depends on the extent
to which other outcomes are considered elating or disappointing.
Finally, this paper considers a finite-horizon model of decision making. In an infinite-horizon
setting, our methods extend to prove necessity of the reinforcement and primacy effects. However,
our methods do not immediately extend to ensure the existence of an infinite-horizon internally
consistent history assignment. One possible way to embed the finite-horizon HDRA preferences
into an infinite-horizon economy is through the use of an overlapping generations model.

Appendix A: Proofs
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 4. We first prove a sequence of four lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any h and t, and any h0 with length t, we have Vhdt >RA Vhh0 >RA Vhet .
Proof. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we may assume h = 0 because one can always
append the lotteries constructed below to a beginning lottery whose support in each stage consists
of a continuation lottery and a prize z, where z ∈ {b, w}. In an abuse of notation, if we write a
lottery or prize as a outcome when there are more stages left than present in the outcome, we mean
that lottery is resolved immediately, with the prize in the terminal stage.
We proceed by induction. For t = 1, this is the reinforcement effect. Suppose by contradiction
that for any non degenerate p, CEe (p) < CEd (p). Fix p and let x be a number in between. Then
hα, p; 1 − α, δ x i has no internally consistent decomposition.
Now assume the claim holds for all s ≤ t − 1, and suppose by contradiction that Vdt is not the
most risk averse. Then there is h0 with length t such that Vh0 >RA Vdt . It must be that h0 = eh00
where h00 has length t − 1, otherwise there is a contradiction to the inductive step using h = d. By
the inductive step, Veh00 is less risk averse than Vedt−1 , so Vedt−1 >RA Vdt . For any nondegenerate
p, this means CEedt−1 (p) < CEdt (p). Iteratively define the lottery Pt−1 by P2 = hα, p; 1 − α, bi,
and for each 3 ≤ s ≤ t − 1, Ps = hα, Ps−1 ; 1 − α, bi. Finally, let Pt = hβ , Pt−1 ; 1 − β , xi, where
x ∈ (CEedt−1 (p),CEdt (p)). Note that the assignment of p must be d t−1 within Pt−1 and that for
α close to one, the value of Pt−1 is either close to CEedt−1 (p) (if Pt−1 is an elation) or close to
CEdt (p) (if Pt−1 is a disappointment). But then for α close enough to 1, there is no consistent
decomposition given the choice of x. Hence Vdt is most risk averse. Analogously, to show that Vet
is least risk averse, assuming it is not true implies CEdh00 (p) > CEet (p), and a similar construction
with w instead of b in Pt , x ∈ (CEet (p),CEdh00 (p)) and α close to one, yields a contradiction.
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Lemma 2. For any h and t, we have Vhdet >RA Vhedt .
Proof. We use the same simplifications as in the previous lemma (without loss of generality). Also
abusing notation, we write τ h to denote either the exogenous threshold rule (where τ h (·) = τ(·) for
all h) or the endogenous threshold rule (where τ h (·) = CEh (·) for all h). We prove the result by
induction. For t = 1, suppose by contradiction that Ved >RA Vde . Consider a nondegenerate lottery
p with w 6∈ supp p. For any β ∈ (0, 1), let P3 = hβ , P, 1 − β , xi, where
P = hε(1 − α), w; εα, p; 1 − 2ε, qi
and ε, α, q, x are chosen as follows. We want q to necessarily be elating (disappointing) if P is
disappointing (elating). Consider the conditions
CEdd (q) > τ d (hα,CEde (p); 1 − α, wi),
CEee (q) < min{τ e (hα,CEee (p); 1 − α, wi),CEed (p)}.
By Lemma 1, τ d (hα,CEde (p); 1 − α, wi) < τ e (hα,CEee (p); 1 − α, wi for each choice of α, β .
This is because the lottery on the RHS first-order stochastically dominates that on the LHS, and
moreover is evaluated using a less risk-averse threshold. By monotonicity of τ h in α, choose α
such that τ e (hα,CEee (p); 1 − α, wi < CEed (p). Choose any non degenerate q where
supp q ⊆ τ d (hα,CEde (p); 1 − α, τ e (hα,CEee (p); 1 − α, wi).
Using betweenness, this condition on the support of q implies that it must be elating (disappointing)
when P is disappointing (elating). For ε sufficiently small, the value of P is either close to CEed (q)
(when P is elating) or close to CEde (q) (when P is disappointing). Pick x ∈ (CEed (q),CEde (q))
and notice that P3 has no consistent decomposition.
Assume the lemma is true for s ≤ t − 1. We prove it for s = t by first proving Vdet >RA Vedt−1 e .
Suppose Vedt−1 e >RA Vdet by contradiction. Define, for any p1 , . . . , pt−1 ∈ L 1 , and s ∈ {2, . . . ,t},
as (α) := τ det−s (α,CEdet−s e (ps−1 ); 1 − αw),
bs (α) := τ edt−s (α,CEedt−s d (ps−1 ); 1 − α, w).
Pick y, ȳ such that w < y < ȳ < b and ensure α is sufficiently small that τ edt−1 (α, ȳ; 1 − α, w) < y.
Take a nondegenerate p1 ∈ L 1 where supp p1 ⊆ [y, ȳ] and p1 (ȳ), p1 (y) > 0. Let a(α) := a1 (α).
Now construct a sequence p2 , . . . , pt−1 where supp ps = supp p1 and as (α) = a for each s, as follows. To construct p2 , compare τ det−3 (α,CEdet−3 d (p1 ); 1 − α, w) with τ det−2 (α,CEdet−2 d (p1 ); 1 −
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α, w). If the latter (reps., former) is the smaller of the two, construct p2 by a first-order reduction
(reps., improvement) in p1 by mixing with δ y (reps., δ ȳ ) using the appropriate weight, which exists
because τ h satisfies betweenness. Similarly construct the rest of the sequence. By the inductive
step, as (α) < bs (α) for each s ∈ {2, . . . ,t} and the sequence of ps above, as (α) = a(α). Therefore,
∩ts=2 (as (α), bs (α)) = (a(α), min bs (α)) 6= 0.
/
s∈{2,...,t}

Let q be a nondegenerate lottery with supp q ⊆ (a(α), mins∈{2,...,t} bs (α)). Construct the lottery
Q = Q2 = h1 − ε, q; ε, wi and for each s ∈ {3, . . . ,t + 1}, define
Qs = hε(1 − α), w; εα, ps−2 ; 1 − ε, Qs−1 i.
Finally, define Qt+2 = hγ, Qt+1 ; 1 − γ, xi where x ∈ (CEedt−1 e (q),CEdet (q)). Using Lemma 1 and
the choice of q’s support in the interval above, each branch Qs (for 2 ≤ s ≤ t) is disappointing
(elating) if Qt+1 is elating (disappointing). For ε sufficiently small, the value of Qt+1 is either very
close to CEedt−1 e (q) when it is elating or CEdet (q) when it is disappointing. But by the choice of x,
there is no consistent decomposition.
To complete the proof, now assume by contradiction that Vedt >RA Vdet . Recall as , bs from
above and the sequence p1 , . . . , pt−1 , constructed so that as (α) = a(α) for every s ∈ {2, . . . ,t}.
Now define, for any p0 ,
a1 (α) := τ det−1 (α,CEdet−1 e (p0 ); 1 − α, w),
b1 (α) := τ edt−1 (α,CEedt−1 e (p0 ); 1 − α, w).
Notice that a1 < b1 by the claim we just proved and also the inductive hypothesis applied to τ h
(tdet−1 is weakly more risk averse than tedt−1 ). Construct p0 with the same support as p1 such that
a1 (α) = a. By the choice of α, notice that b1 < CEedt−1 d (p0 ). Let q̃ be a nondegenerate lottery
with supp q̃ ⊆ (a(α), mins∈{1,...,t} bs (α)). For each s ∈ {2, . . . ,t + 1}, define
Q̃s = hε(1 − α), w; εα, ps−2 ; 1 − ε, Q̃s−1 i.
Finally, define Q̃t+2 = hγ, Q̃t+1 ; 1 − γ, xi where x ∈ (CEedt−1 e (q̃),CEdet (q̃)). For ε sufficiently
small, the certainty equivalent of Q̃t+1 is either very close to CEedt−1 e (q̃) when it is elating or
CEdet (q̃) when it is disappointing. But then Q̃t+1 has no internally consistent assignment.
For any V : L 1 → R, define, for any p ∈ L 1 , e (p) := {x ∈ supp p | V (δ x ) > V (p)} and
d (p) := {x ∈ supp p | V (δ x ) < V (p)}.
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Lemma 3. Consider any lottery p = hp(x1 ), x1 ; . . . ; p(x j ), x j ; . . . ; p(xm ), xm i and another lottery
p0 = hp(x1 ), x10 ; . . . ; p(x j ), x j ; . . . ; p(xm ), xm i which differs by one prize. For V in the betweenness
class: (1) if x1 6∈ d(p) and x10 > x1 then x10 ∈ e(p0 ); and (2) if x1 6∈ e(p) and x10 < x1 then x10 ∈ d(p0 ).
Proof. We prove statement (1), since the proof of (2) is analogous. If x1 6∈ d(p) then δ x1  p, where
 represents V . Note that p can be written as the convex combination of the lotteries δ x1 (with
p(x2 )
p(xm )
weight p(x1 )) and p−1 = h 1−p(x
, x2 ; . . . ; 1−p(x
, xm i (with weight 1 − p(x1 )). By betweenness,
1)
1)
this implies that δ x1  p−1 . Since x10 > x, monotonicity implies δ x10  δ x1  p−1 , and thus that
δ x10  p−1 . But then again by betweenness and the fact that p(x1 ) ∈ (0, 1), x10 must be strictly
preferred to the convex combination of δ x10 (with weight p(x1 )) and p−1 (with weight 1 − p(x1 )).
But that convex combination is p0 , meaning that x10 ∈ e(p0 ).
Lemma 4. Suppose that for any nondegenerate p ∈ L 1 , CEe (p) > CEd (p). Then for any nondegenerate P ∈ L 2 , a consistent history assignment (using only strict elation and disappointment for
nondegenerate lotteries in its support) exists.
Proof. Consider P = hα 1 , p1 ; . . . ; α m , pm i. Suppose for simplicity that all pi are nondegenerate (if
pi = δ x is degenerate, then CEe (pi ) = CEd (pi ), so the algorithm can be run on the nondegenerate
sublotteries, with the degenerate ones labeled ex-post according to internal consistency). Without loss of generality, suppose that the indexing in P is such that p1 ∈ arg maxi=1,...,m CEe (pi ),
pm ∈ arg mini=2,...,m CEd (pi ), and CEe (p2 ) ≥ CEe (p3 ) ≥ · · · ≥ CEe (pm−1 ). A consistent decomposition is constructed by the following algorithm (consistency means that all pi set as elations
(disappointments) have CEe(d) (pi ) weakly larger (strictly smaller) than the certainty equivalent of
P calculated by folding back using this assignment). Set a1 (p1 ) = e and a1 (p j ) = d for all i > 1.
Let CE 1 be the certainty equivalent of P when it is folded back under a1 ; if CE 1 is consistent
with a1 , the algorithm and proof are complete. If not, consider i = 2. If CEd (p2 ) ≥ CE 1 , then set
a2 (p2 ) = e and a2 (pi ) = a1 (pi ) for all i 6= 2 (if CEd (p2 ) < CE 1 , let a2 (pi ) = a1 (pi ) for all i). Let
CE 2 be the resulting certainty equivalent of P when it is folded back under a2 . If CE 2 is consistent
with a2 , the algorithm and proof are complete. If not, move to i = 3, and so on and so forth, so
long as i ≤ m − 1. Notice from Lemma 3 that if CEd (pi ) ≥ CE i−1 , then CEe (pi )) > CE i . Moreover, notice that if CEe (pi ) > CE i , then for any j < i, CEe (p j ) ≥ CEe (pi ) > CE i , so previously
switched assignments remain strict elations; also, because CE i ≥ CE i−1 for all i, previous disappointments remain disappointments. If the final step of the algorithm reaches i = m − 1, notice
that CEd (pm ) is the lowest disappointment certainty equivalent, therefore the lowest value among
{CEam−1 (p j ) (p j )} j=1,...,m . Hence, the final history assignment am−1 is consistent with CE m−1 .
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We are now ready to complete the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4. The reinforcement and primacy
effects are necessary by Lemmas 1 and 2. By Lemma 4 and the reinforcement effect, an internally
consistent (strict) history assignment exists for any nondegenerate P ∈ L 2 , using any initial Vh .
By induction, suppose that for any (t − 1)-stage lottery an internally consistent history assignment
exists, using any initial Vh . Consider a t-stage nondegenerate lottery Pt = hα 1 , P1t−1 ; . . . ; α m , Pmt−1 i.
Notice that the algorithm in Lemma 4 for L 2 only uses the fact that CEe (p) > CEd (p) for any
nondegenerate p ∈ L 1 . But the same algorithm can be used to construct an internally consistent
history assignment for Pt if for any Pt−1 ∈ L t−1 , CEe (Pt−1 ) > CEd (Pt−1 ). While there may be
multiple consistent assignments of Pt−1 using each of Ve and Vd , the primacy effect ensures this
strict inequality regardless of the history assignment. Indeed, starting with Ve , the tree is folded
back using higher certainty equivalents sublottery by sublottery, and evaluated using a less risk
averse single-stage utility, as compared to starting with the more risk averse Vd . As in Lemma 4,
the history for any degenerate sublottery can be assigned ex-post according to what is consistent;
its certainty equivalent is not affected by the assignment of e or d. This proves Theorem 4, from
which Theorem 1 follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of necessity is analogous to that of Theorem 1. The proof of
sufficiency is analogous as well, with two additions of note. First, since the reinforcement and
strong primacy effects imply the certainty equivalent of each decision problem in a choice set increases when evaluated as an elation, the certainty equivalent of the choice set (the maximum of
those values) also increases when viewed as an elation (relative to being viewed as a disappointment). Second, if the certainty equivalent of a choice set is the same when viewed as an elation
and as a disappointment, the best option in both choice sets must be degenerate. Then its history
assignment may be made ex-post according to internal consistency.
Proof of Proposition 1. Rearrange Equation (1) to
 

−1
uh uhe (1 − α)uhe (H) + αuhe (L) − uh (L)
1−α

>

 

−1
uh uhe αuhe (H) + (1 − α)uhe (L) − uh (L)
α

.

−1
Observe that we may write uh = f ◦ uhe for some function f ; hence u−1
he = uh ◦ f . Dividing both
sides by the positive term uhe (H) − uhe (L) then yields



f uhe (L) + (1 − α)(uhe (H) − uhe (L)) − f (uhe (L))



f uhe (L) + α(uhe (H) − uhe (L)) − f (uhe (L))
>

(1 − α)(uhe (H) − uhe (L))
37

α(uhe (H) − uhe (L))

.

The ratios on each side are slopes of segments joining points on the graph of f , starting at
f (uhe (L)). Note that α > .5 if and only if α(uhe (H) − uhe (L)) > (1 − α)(uhe (H) − uhe (L)). But
then the above inequality holding for all α ∈ (.5, 1) and H > L is equivalent to concavity of f , or
equivalently, that Vhe <RA Vh .
Appendix A.1: Eliciting the threshold
Define τ based on the DM’s preference  as follows. For x ∈ X and q = hq1 , x1 ; . . . ; qn , xn i ∈
L (X), we say δ x τ q (resp., q τ δ x ) if there is x0 < x (resp., x0 > x) and p ∈ L (X) nondegenerate such that `e (δ x0 ) ∼ `e (p) (resp., `d (δ x0 ) ∼ `d (p)) and h.5, δ Tp −1 ; .5q1 , δ Tx1 ; . . . ; .5qn , δ Txn i ∼
h.5, δ Tx0 ; .5q1 , δ Tx1 ; . . . ; .5qn , δ Txn i. For p, q ∈ L (X), we say p τ q if there is x ∈ X such that p τ
δ x τ q. We say p ∼τ q if p 6τ q and q 6τ p
Lemma 5. τ(p) > τ(q) if and only if p τ q.
Proof. If τ(p) > τ(q), then take x0 > x > x00 such that τ(p) > τ(δ x0 ) = x0 > τ(δ x ) = x > τ(δ x00 ) =
x00 > τ(q). By admissibility of Vh , we can pick α 0 , α 00 ∈ (0, 1) such that r0 = hα 0 , x0 ; 1 − α 0 , x00 i
and r00 = hα 00 , x0 ; 1 − α 00 , x00 i satisfy CEd (r0 ) = CE(δ x ) and CEe (r00 ) = CEe (δ x ). Since τ(q) < x00 <
x < x0 < τ(p), we have p τ δ x and x τ δ q , which means p τ q. Now, suppose p τ q. This
means there is x such that p τ x τ q, and so there exist x0 > x such that p τ δ x0 and x00 <
x such that δ x00 τ q. Since h.5, δ rT −1 ; .5q1 , δ Tx1 ; . . . ; .5qn , δ Txn i ∼ h.5, δ Tx0 ; .5q1 , δ Tx1 ; . . . ; .5qn , δ Txn i
for some nondegenerate r such that CEd (r) = CEd (δ x0 ), the representation implies that τ(δ x0 ) <
τ(h.5, δ x0 ; .5p1 , δ x1 ; . . . ; .5pn , δ xn i), which by betweenness means that τ(δ x0 ) < τ(p). Similarly,
from x00 τ q, we have τ(δ x00 ) > τ(q), concluding the proof by transitivity.

Appendix B: Proofs for the asset-pricing application
Lemma 6. The history assignment is unique.
Proof. If it were internally consistent after y1 for H to be disappointing and L to be elating, that
would mean L+Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ2 ) > H +Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ2 ), or H −L < Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ2 )−Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ2 ).
Notice that Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ2 ) < 21 H + 21 L (the boundary case λ h(y1 )e = 0) and Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ2 ) > L (the
case λ h(y1 )d = ∞). Thus, H − L < Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )e , ỹ2 ) − Γỹ2 (λ h(y1 )d , ỹ2 ) < 12 H − 12 L, a contradiction.
Suppose by contradiction that in the first period, H is disappointing and L is elating. Internal consistency requires L + Γỹ2 (λ e , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(L,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )) > H + Γỹ2 (λ d , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(H,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )).
But since this is also the certainty equivalent of a (more complex) random variable, we have the
bound Γỹ2 (λ d , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(H,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )) > L + Γỹ3 (λ dd , ỹ3 ) > 2L. Similarly, we also have the bound
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Γỹ2 (λ e , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(L,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )) < 21 (H + L + Γỹ3 (λ ee , ỹ3 ) + Γỹ3 (λ ed , ỹ3 )) < H + L. But then we have
a contradiction H − L < Γỹ2 (λ e , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(L,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )) − Γỹ2 (λ d , ỹ2 + Γỹ3 (λ h(H,ỹ2 ) , ỹ3 )) < H − L.
Lemma 7. P(H) > P(L).
Proof. Using (3), we know P(H) > P(L) if and only if the following function is negative:
G(λ 0 , H, L) :=λ 0 (H − L)(a2 − b2 )+


λ 0 a2 (Γỹ3 (a3 λ 0 , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (a2 bλ 0 , ỹ3 )) − b2 (Γỹ3 (b2 aλ 0 , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (b3 λ 0 , ỹ3 )) ,
where ỹ3is H or L with probability
 1/2. By pulling out the term exp(−λ L), note that Γỹ3 (λ , ỹ3 ) =
1
1
1
L − λ ln 2 exp(−λ (H − L)) + 2 . Hence
1 1
1
2
G(λ 0 , H, L) =λ 0 (H − L)(a − b ) + ln
exp(−λ 0 a b(H − L)) +
b
2
2

1
1
1 1 1
1
3
3
− ln
exp(−λ 0 a (H − L)) +
exp(−λ 0 b (H − L)) +
− ln
a
2
2
b
2
2


1
1
1
exp(−λ 0 ab2 (H − L)) + .
+ ln
a
2
2
2

2

G
We want to show that ∂∂ H
(λ 0 , H, L) < 0, implying G(λ 0 , H, L) would be maximized at H = L,
where it has value zero. The derivative of G with respect to H is given by



∂G
2
3
2
2
3
2
(λ 0 , H, L) = λ 0 a (1 + g(a ) − g(a b)) − b (1 − g(b ) + g(ab )) ,
∂H
using the definition g(x) =

exp(−λ 0 x(H−L))
exp(−λ 0 x(H−L))+1 .

Note that g0 (x) =

−λ 0 x(H−L) exp(λ 0 x(H−L))
.
x(1+exp(λ 0 x(H−L)))2

Moreover,

− 1x < g0 (x) < 0 for all x ≥ 0. Negativity of g0 (x) is clear. To see the left bound, simply observe
that λ 0 x(H − L) exp(λ 0 x(H − L)) ≤ (exp(λ 0 x(H − L)))2 . The mean value theorem says that for
some c1 ∈ (a3 , a2 b) we have g(a3 ) − g(a2 b) = a2 (a − b)g0 (c1 ). Similarly, for some c2 ∈ (ab2 , b3 )
we have g(ab2 ) − g(b3 ) = b2 (a − b)g0 (c2 ). Then,




∂G
1
2
2
4
0
4
0
2
2
4
(λ 0 , H, L) = λ 0 a −b +a (a−b)g (c1 )−b (a−b)g (c2 ) < λ 0 a −b +a (a−b)(− 2 ) ,
∂H
ab
3

which equals λ 0 (a − b)(a + b − ba2 ). This is negative as desired, since 0 < a < 1 < b.
Lemma 8. P(H) > P(0).

39

Proof. Since a < 1, it suffices to show that a2 (Γỹ3 (a3 λ 0 , ỹ3 ) − Γỹ3 (a2 bλ 0 , ỹ3 )) is smaller than
Γỹ2 (a2 λ 0 , ỹ2 +Γỹ3 (λ h(H,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 ))−Γỹ2 (b2 λ 0 , ỹ2 +Γỹ3 (λ h(L,y˜2 ) , ỹ3 )). To show this,20 define Γ̂(λ , m, n) ≡
Γx̃ (λ , x̃) for the random variable x̃ which gives each of m and n with probability one-half. Also, we
define the notation µ = Γ̂(a3 λ 0 , H, L) and ν = Γ̂(a2 bλ 0 , H, L). Because Γ̂(λ , m, n) is a certainty
equivalent, it is increasing in both m, n and decreasing in λ . Because b2 λ 0 > ab, b2 a > a3 , and
b3 > a2 b, it suffices to show Γ̂(a2 λ 0 , H + µ, L + ν) − Γ̂(abλ 0 , H + µ, L + ν) > a2 (µ − ν), which
is stronger. Letting γ(λ , m, n) = −λ 2 ∂∂ λΓ̂ (λ , m, n), we note γ satisfies three properties: (i) ∂∂λγ > 0;
(ii) if m > n, ∂∂mγ > 0; and (iii) γ(λ , m + c, n + c) = γ(λ , m, n) for all c > 0. To see this, observe that
γ(λ , m, n) =

exp(−λ m) + exp(−λ n)
−λ m exp(−λ m) − λ n exp(−λ n)
− ln(
).
exp(−λ m) + exp(−λ n)
2

Property (iii) then follows from simple algebra. Property (i) follows from the fact that
∂γ
λ (m − n)2 exp(−λ (m + n))
(λ , m, n) =
> 0.
∂λ
(exp(−λ m) + exp(−λ n))2
Using p = exp(−λ m), q = exp(−λ n) in γ, observe that the derivative of
respect to p is

q(ln p−ln q)
(p+q)2

< 0, since p < q. Property (ii) follows by

Z

2

Γ̂(a λ 0 , H + µ, L + ν) − Γ(abλ , H + µ, L + ν) =

abλ 0

−
a2 λ 0
abλ 0

Z
=

(by definition)

a2 λ 0
abλ 0

Z
=

(by property (iii) of γ)

a2 λ 0
abλ 0

Z
(by µ > ν, a < 1, and properties (i)-(ii) of γ)

>
a2 λ 0

Z
(changing variables to y = ax)

a3 λ 0

Z

1
γ(ax, H, L)dx
x2
1

γ(y, H, L) dy
( ay )2
a
−

a3 λ 0

∂ Γ̂
(y, H, L)dy
∂λ

> a2 (Γ̂(a3 λ 0 , H, L) − Γ̂(a2 bλ 0 , H, L)).

(since a < 1)
20 We

1
γ(x, H + µ − ν, L)dx
x2

a2 bλ 0

=a

(by definition)

∂ Γ̂
(x, H + µ, L + ν)dx
∂λ

1

thank Xiaosheng Mu for providing the argument showing this inequality.
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with

< 0. To complete the proof,

1
γ(x, H + µ, L + ν)dx
x2

a2 bλ 0

=

dp
dm

p ln p+q ln q
− ln( p+q
p+q
2 )
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